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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS A BASIS FOR
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE LESSONS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
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ABSTRACT
This Article advocates that courts should rely more heavily on an
underappreciated method of constitutional interpretation:
reference to parallel state constitutional text and jurisprudence.
This article is novel insofar as it develops a normative argument
for why courts should consult state constitutions in interpreting the
meaning of the federal constitution. To illustrate the value of this
method for jurists who ascribe to various judicial philosophies, the
authors apply this method to the U.S. Supreme Court’s newly
developed Second Amendment jurisprudence. While District of
Columbia v. Heller provides some guidance in interpreting the
Second Amendment under the Court’s new framework, many
questions remain unanswered in its wake. For instance, the Court
has not yet answered what level of scrutiny should apply to Second
Amendment regulations. Additional questions include exactly
what kinds of “arms” will fall within the protection of the
Amendment, in what kinds of places the right be given greater
sanctity, and how protected arms may and may not be carried or
stored. The authors argue, and illustrate with examples, how the
states have widely already addressed these issues under their state
constitutions, with striking uniformity in their conclusions.
This Article is empirically valuable because it is a repository for
data on a number of issues related to the Second Amendment. It
catalogues the exact number of states, with citations, that have
adopted the reasonable regulation standard and the number of
states that have upheld concealed carry bans. It also collects data
on a number of other, related, characteristics of these states, such
as cataloguing the states that consider the right to bear arms
fundamental and cataloguing the number of states that have found
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“self defense” to be one of the animating concerns under their
right to bear arms. Additionally, this Article provides data for
originalists on the number of states with constitutions at different
points in time relevant to the historical analysis, not just at the time
of the founding, and among those states, the number of states with
right to bear arms provisions. Finally, it catalogues the number of
states from that period with language similar to that used in the
federal Second Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses, and answers affirmatively, one central question: can
federal courts gain insights from the comparative use of state constitutions in
interpreting the Federal Constitution? A great debate rages on in the legal community
regarding how American courts and the people should interpret the U.S.
Constitution, a debate which turns in large part on which methods of interpretation
are valid, and which are not. Some, called originalists, prefer to rely on methods that
illuminate the original, historical meaning of the Constitution. In contrast, others,
whom the authors refer to as modernists, urge reliance on modes of interpretation
that reflect modern American values. Others still follow a mix of these two views,
or different views entirely. But scholars and jurists from all camps have at least one
thing in common: they all are constantly searching for methods of interpretation that
will provide objective answers that reflect American values, either past or present.
The authors here argue that consulting state constitutional text and jurisprudence
should satisfy jurists and scholars from both sides of the aisle.
Courts and scholars have focused little attention on the normative question
of whether courts should adopt this form of comparative constitutional interpretation.
In some contexts, for example Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, federal courts have
looked first to the actions of U.S. states before turning abroad.1 However, in many
other contexts, the Supreme Court and lower courts have barely looked at state
constitutions and how they have been interpreted in analyzing the Federal
Constitution. The lack of reference to state constitutions is puzzling, especially in
light of the Supreme Court’s repeated references to foreign law when interpreting
the Federal Constitution.2 Turning next to academia, only recently have scholars
begun looking to state constitutional provisions in analyzing the meaning of the

1. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565, 576–78 (2005) (considering evidence of a
national consensus through the actions of states before looking to the trend in the international
community); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–17 (2002) (same). Note, however, that even here the
Court looks primarily to state legislation rather than state constitutional decisions. But the Supreme Court
historically, though not often in recent jurisprudence, has considered state constitutions in some other
constitutional contexts as well, for example, the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 482 & n.10 (1957).
2. See Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a Wider Civilization: Lawrence and
the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1288–97 (2004) (reviewing the court’s varied uses of foreign law in interpreting the
Federal Constitution).
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Federal Constitution.3 Indeed, this analytical approach also has been validated by the
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, where both the majority and Justice
Stevens in dissent referred repeatedly to state constitutions in their analysis of the
Second Amendment.4 However, there is a dearth of normative analysis as to whether
and why courts should or should not turn to state constitutions in analyzing the
meaning and scope of the Federal Constitution.5
To illustrate the potential insights that reference to state constitutions may
provide, the authors focus on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. We
conclude that state provisions respecting the right to bear arms and corresponding
jurisprudence can benefit interpretation of the Second Amendment in myriad ways.
It can provide information that (a) facilitates moral assessments of which values the
U.S. Constitution aims to reflect, (b) assists courts with empirical assessments
because courts may look to the real world implications of state interpretations, (c)
provides a library of rationales employed by state courts,6 and (d) provides historical
insight into the original meaning of language and concepts enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution.
Turning to the Second Amendment, from a moral assessment standpoint,
state court decisions suggest that nearly every jurisdiction to have considered the
issues agree that: (a) legislation limiting the right to bear arms merits a specific level
3. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten CommonLaw Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law”, 77 MISS.
L.J. 1, 22–23, 87–137 (2007) (analyzing state search and seizure provisions from the founding era in
analyzing the Framers’ expectations with respect to the scope of the Federal Fourth Amendment); David
B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 827, 827–
28 (2002) (analyzing substantively what lessons these state provisions may offer for courts interpreting
the Federal Second Amendment); Stephen R. McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual
Sovereignty: The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 867 (2011) (describing the
relationship between state and federal constitutional provisions and making predictions about how state
constitutions may be used by courts in analyzing the Federal Second Amendment); Eugene Volokh, The
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998) (discussing how the content of state
provisions on the right to bear arms should inform our understanding of the Federal Second Amendment).
4. 554 U.S. 570, 585, 601–603, 629 (2008) (majority opinion); id. at 641 n.5, 642–43 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 3, at 828 (assuming that state constitutional provisions on the right
to bear arms are relevant to analyzing the Federal Second Amendment with only a very cursory
explanation, and then analyzing substantively what lessons these state provisions may offer for courts
interpreting the Federal Second Amendment); McAllister, supra note 3, at 867 (describing the relationship
between state and federal constitutional provisions without any normative analysis of what kind of
relationship they should have); Volokh, supra note 3, at 793–96 (assuming that state constitutions are
relevant in analyzing the Federal Second Amendment without explanation and discussing how the content
of state provisions on the right to bear arms should inform our understanding of the Federal Second
Amendment); Eric R. Nitz, Note, Comparing Apples to Apples: A Federalism-Based Theory for the Use
of Founding-Era State Constitutions to Interpret the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 295, 296–99 (2011)
(analyzing when early state constitutional provisions may be relevant in analyzing the Federal
Constitution, but not whether or why they should be considered relevant, and not considering whether,
why, or when modern state constitutional provisions should be considered in analyzing the Federal
Constitution); see also Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 487–90 (2004) (describing early state laws on gun
rights (not constitutions) with only a normative explanation of why courts and commentators should look
to early laws, but not to state law or state constitutions generally).
6. See Larsen, supra note 2, at 1289–90, 1295.
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of scrutiny, the reasonable regulation standard, and (b) state legislatures can
legitimately ban the concealed carry of even constitutionally protected weapons.
Additionally, with respect to reason borrowing, state court decisions convincingly
explain why jurisdictions have so uniformly come to these conclusions. Finally, with
respect to historical insights, the text from early right-to-bear-arms provisions, as
well as historical jurisprudence interpreting these state provisions, show that these
conclusions are anchored in our nation’s history.
In Part I, we review the potential insights generally available from
comparative constitutional analysis to provide a context for the specific insights we
identify in studying right-to-bear-arms jurisprudence. In Part II, we consider the state
of development of the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence and some
important issues that remain open. Finally, in Part III, we attempt to illustrate with
state interpretations of the right to bear arms how such state constitutional
constructions could benefit federal courts in shaping and applying the Second
Amendment.
I.

THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS

If we look to the debate over consulting foreign law to interpret the U.S.
Constitution, it identifies some of the main strengths and weaknesses of comparative
constitutional interpretation generally.7 First we address four key strengths that
comparative analysis can provide: (a) moral assessments of which values the U.S.
Constitution aims to reflect, (b) empirical assessments of the real-world impact of
differing legal interpretations, (c) reason borrowing,8 and (d) historical insight into
the original meaning of various constitutional provisions.
Turning first to the “moral fact-finding” value of comparative analysis,
looking to the sheer number of states that interpret the law in a certain way can reveal
patterns about the values that different jurisdictions have found reflected in particular
constitutional provisions.9 As Joan Larsen identifies, the Court has previously
engaged in this use of comparative analysis to assess how other jurisdictions decide
a particular legal issue.10
Turning next to the empirical value of comparative analysis, studying how
other jurisdictions have interpreted constitutional provisions similar to our own
7. Various articles have contributed to this debate. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003) (noting that the Court has considered foreign law in Eighth
Amendment, federalism, and right to die cases, amongst others); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of
Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254–71
(2001); Larsen, supra note 2, at 1286; Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 348, 350 (2002); Austin L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign
Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L. J. CONST. L.
519 (2005) [hereinafter Foreign Materials Debate]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the American
Constitution Society, Looking Beyond our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication (Aug. 2, 2003) (transcript available in University of Cambridge Video &
Audio Collections), http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1209836.
8. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 2.
9. See id. at 1295–96.
10. Id. at 1293.
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provides our judges a valuable legal laboratory.11 It exposes judges to the scope of
potential solutions and the consequences of each alternative.12 As Larsen explains,
“[m]uch of constitutional law depends upon predictions about the likely effect of a
rule.”13 Certainly level-of-scrutiny analysis, which asks whether a law is “rationally
related,” “important,” or “necessary” to forwarding a particular governmental
interest, turns on empirical assessments or, in the absence of empirical data,
assumptions. The ability to look to distinct jurisdictions that already have such laws
to determine what impact, if any, they have had on the identified governmental
interest, should greatly assist our judges in making these difficult assessments.14
Third, comparative analysis can also assist with “reason borrowing.” This
concept simply describes a practice already very familiar within American
jurisprudence: where one court, in addressing a novel issue, looks to the reasons
given by the court of another jurisdiction in addressing that same issue, and adopts
those reasons in its analysis.15 Given the relative dearth of federal case law under the
Second Amendment compared with the great abundance of such case law under state
right-to-bear-arms provisions,16 the reason-borrowing value of employing this
method in the Second Amendment context is at its apex.17
Finally, comparative analysis of state analogues to federal constitutional
provisions, especially those enacted during the relevant historical time periods,
provides information about the meaning of the particular words chosen for a specific
constitutional provision and the historically understood meaning of those terms. For
the textualist, comparing the U.S. Constitution’s provisions to state constitution
counterparts, especially those enacted contemporaneously with the Federal
Constitution, can inform the significance of word choice and structure. The Federal
Constitution was adopted in 1787.18 At one point, constitutions drafted before 1800
governed at least sixteen states: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
11. See Larsen, supra note 2, at 1299–1300; Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the
Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365, 1369–73 (2014); Foreign Material Debate, supra note
7, at 522–23.
12. See Breyer, supra note 7, at 266; Foreign Materials Debate, supra note 7, at 522–23; Larsen,
supra note 2, at 1299–1300; see also, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (referring to the experiences of foreign jurisdictions to illustrate how requiring state officials
to administer federal law would not undermine federalist goals).
13. Larsen, supra note 2, at 1299.
14. See, e.g., id. at 1289–91 (discussing the Court’s use of comparative empirical assessments in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
15. See id. at 1291–92.
16. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597, 599 (2006)
(referring to the Second Amendment jurisprudence as a “constitutional ghost town” and state
jurisprudence regarding the right to bear arms as a “bustling metropolis” (quoting CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 124 (2001))).
17. The difficulty that the federal courts have had in settling upon an analytical framework is
exemplified by comparing the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2015), United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138,
1142–43 (9th Cir. 2013), and Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
714 F.3d 334, 335–36, 346 (5th Cir. 2013).
18. Primary Documents in American History: United States Constitution, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Constitution.html (last visited March 6, 2016).
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Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.19
Further, the Fourteenth Amendment, through which our Bill of Rights has been
incorporated, was enacted in 1868.20 Thirty-seven states had constitutions by that
point in time, creating a powerful, comprehensive database from which jurists can
draw.21 And by the end of the nineteenth century, forty-five states had constitutions,
which may serve as informative reference points for how society viewed various
liberty and property interests.22 Thus, analyzing the language used in historical state
analogues to federal constitutional provisions can assist jurists in discerning the
original meaning of our Constitution’s text.23 To the extent that long-standing
precedent interpreting a provision in a particular way also exists, this should also
inform the accepted historical understanding of the term.24
Next we must ask whether the jurisdictions chosen for comparison are
materially similar to the U.S. federal legal system such that the comparisons are apt.
Critics of comparative constitutional analysis have emphasized the risk, when
looking to foreign jurisdictions, of incomplete or inaccurate analysis.25 They reason
that fully understanding a court’s decision requires knowledge of the jurisdiction’s
legal structure, culture, and history.26 This argument is based on the view that as a
democracy, only the views of the American people can inform the intended meaning
of America’s Constitution.27
However valid that concern may be when looking to foreign law, it has little
force with respect to comparative analysis of the constitutional decisions of the
Union’s own states. First, at least with respect to the states that emerged around the
19. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
and Virginia. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
22. See infra Appendix, Table 2; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614–19 (2008)
(the Supreme Court majority painstakingly reviewing nineteenth century views on the right to bear arms
in interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment).
23. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–21 (1999)
(quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy
Gutmann, ed., 1997)); Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO.
L.J. 569, 578–79 (1998).
24. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 828 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part)
(“When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most likely public understanding of a
particular provision at the time it was adopted.”); Greenberg & Litman, supra note 23, at 574–77.
25. Larsen, supra note 2, at 1301; see also Foreign Materials Debate, supra note 7, at 528–29 (Scalia
implicitly notes the importance of understand context in analyzing foreign law); Alberto R. Gonzales,
Legal Implications of a Rising China: Remarks at the University of Chicago Law School, 7 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 289, 296 (2006) (noting the risk of erroneous interpretations of foreign law).
26. Larsen, supra note 2, at 1300–1301; see also Foreign Materials Debate, supra note 7, at 528–29
(Scalia notes that there is danger in using foreign law if the interpreter does not understand the surrounding
jurisprudence).
27. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (emphasizing that only American
conceptions of decency matters, not views in other nations), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 574–75 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–201 (2005) (statement of J. Roberts);
Foreign Materials Debate, supra note 7, at 533–34; Gonzales, supra note 25, at 299–300.
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time of the founding,28 or that were in existence at the time that the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted,29 those states and the nation as a whole will often share
common histories and linguistic understandings at the relevant periods of enactment.
Moreover, the similarities between state and national legal histories and cultures,
even with respect to newer states, will often outweigh the differences because all
fifty states have developed within a shared national legal culture. Finally, the fact
that state courts look to each other frequently in construing their own constitutions
suggests that these courts have found the similarities sufficiently great to make
comparative analysis meaningful.
Because of the four valuable insights provided by comparative analysis, our
federal courts generally should find it profitable to look to state constitutions and
jurisprudence in interpreting the Federal Constitution.30 We conclude that state
constitutional decisions provide a legal laboratory that courts can look to for
guidance. In viewing state constitutional decisions as a legal laboratory, the concerns
of skeptics that our democratic Constitution should reflect the experiences and values
of our nation’s people are satisfied.
II.

THE COURT’S SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

In order to provide critical context for our Second Amendment example of
how state constitutional provisions and jurisprudence can assist courts in discerning
the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, in this Part we provide background on the
Court’s evolving jurisprudence regarding the Second Amendment. We then identify
some of the legal issues in the Second Amendment context that remain open in the
wake of the Court’s two leading cases.

28. Such states include Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. See infra Appendix, Table 1. See generally The Avalon Project:
Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, Colonial Charters, Grants, and Related Documents, YALE
L. SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/statech.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
29. These states include all states listed above, supra note 28, as well as Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix,
Table 2. Several additional states came into existence by the end of the nineteenth century, and thus their
constitutions may provide insight into how individuals around the time that the Fourteenth Amendment
was enacted viewed the right to bear arms. See infra Appendix, Table 2 (listing Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming as states in this category).
30. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 501 (1977) (“Prior to the adoption of the [F]ederal Constitution, each of the rights eventually
recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more of the state
constitutions.”); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 469–72 (1999) (providing a
detailed and persuasive analysis of the normative value of state constitutions).
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s Evolving Federal Second Amendment
Jurisprudence

The first seminal cases addressing the Second Amendment are United
States v. Cruikshank,31 and Presser v. Illinois.32 In Cruikshank, criminal defendants
raised a Second Amendment challenge to a state law that made it unlawful for
multiple individuals to, in disguise, conspire to “injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and
enjoyment of any [federal constitutional or statutory] right. . . . “33 The defendants in
Cruikshank had allegedly banded together and conspired to “injure, oppress,
threaten, and intimidate” two African American citizens, with intent, in part, to
deprive them of their right to bear arms.34 The Court struck down the indictment
relying on this alleged act, on the basis that the Second Amendment right to bear
arms did not apply to the states, and thus the Second Amendment did not secure this
right to individuals.35
Subsequently, in Presser, a defendant challenged a state law that made it
unlawful for bodies of men, other than the state militia, to associate as a military
organization, and to have drills or parades in public with arms, absent a license by
the Illinois governor.36 The Court relied on the proposition in Cruikshank that “the
amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National
government, and not upon that of the States.”37 Thus, Presser stood squarely for the
proposition that the Second Amendment does not apply to state action.38

31. 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (distinguishing rather than explicitly overruling Cruikshank because the
Cruikshank Court had relied on the Privileges & Immunities Clause in holding that the Second
Amendment did not apply to the states, but effectively overruling Cruikshank by then holding that the
Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause),
abrogated by McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59, 791 (2010).
32. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
33. 92 U.S. at 548.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 553, 556–57. Admittedly, this logic seems faulty; from the fact that a federal right does not
apply to state action (as distinguished from federal action), it does not follow that the federal right no
longer exists as applied to U.S. citizens. The challenged law aimed to protect the right to enjoy federal
constitutional rights and give individuals a remedy for violation of these rights, which, by definition,
would include the Federal Second Amendment unless it were not interpreted to be an individual right.
The Cruikshank Court never appeared to go as far as declaring the Second Amendment to not be an
individual right. Thus, the Court’s basis for dismissing these counts of the indictment was arguably flawed
on its own terms. See Anders Walker, From Ballots to Bullets: District of Columbia v. Heller and the New
Civil Rights, 69 LA. L. REV. 509, 528–29 (2009).
36. 116 U.S. at 264–65.
37. Id. at 265.
38. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in McDonald v. City of Chicago, but has disagreed
on whether the precedent remains relevant, focusing on the constitutional basis for denying incorporation
against the states. Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59, 791 (2010)
(distinguishing rather than explicitly overruling Cruikshank on the basis that the Cruikshank Court had
relied on the Privileges & Immunities Clause, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
in holding that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states) with id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the “incorporation question was squarely . . . resolved in the late 19th century” by citing to,
inter alia, Cruikshank and Presser). The Privileges & Immunities Clause has recently been advanced and
rejected as a constitutional bar to state limitations on an out-of-state resident’s claim to a Colorado
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Several decades later in 1939, in United States v. Miller, the Court tested a
challenged gun control regulation against the standard of whether the targeted
activity, possession or use of a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches long,
“ha[d] some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia.”39 Thus, the Court’s test in Miller was that any gun control
regulation would be upheld as long as it did not target activity that had a reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia. The Court
explained that the Second Amendment’s guarantees were made “[w]ith obvious
purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [the
militia],” and stressed that this Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with
that end in view.”40
Two recent cases addressing the Second Amendment may have in practical
effect, if not formally, overruled this historic case law. First, in District of Columbia
v. Heller, the Court interpreted the Second Amendment as creating an individual
right belonging to all Americans that extends not just to supporting service in state
militias, but also to facilitating self defense.41 It relied on this self-defense purpose
in striking down the ban on handguns, reasoning that the “handgun ban amounts to
a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American
society for” purposes of self defense.42 One can read this holding as implicitly, if not
explicitly, overruling United States v. Miller insofar as Miller construed the Second
Amendment to only protect gun possession and use for purposes of participation in
a militia, and relied on that construction in upholding the conviction at issue.
However, the majority in Heller stressed that it in no way intended to overrule Miller,
reading Miller not as limiting the protected purposes for carrying weapons under the
Second Amendment, but rather as limiting protected weapons under the Second
Amendment to those that had a reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia.43 Thus, this Miller test may still retain its
vitality.
The Heller Court also made several observations about the potential scope
of the Second Amendment throughout its opinion. For example, it interpreted the
term “arms” to include modern weapons, including those “that were not specifically
designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity,”44 as long as
they were “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time’” of the events.45
Synthesizing all of language in the operative clause of the Amendment, the Court
concluded that this clause “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry

concealed carry permit. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Fern L.
Kletter, Annotation, Restrictions on Ownership Possession or Sale of Weapons Infringing Federal
Constitutional Right to Travel, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 8 (2015).
39. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
40. Id.
41. 554 U.S. 570, 581, 592, 628 (2008).
42. Id. at 628.
43. Id. at 621–22.
44. Id. at 581–82.
45. Id. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179). This rationale has its rationale in early nineteenth
century state court interpretations.
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weapons in case of confrontation.”46 However, it stressed that the term “arms,”
consistent with Miller47 “does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”48 The
Court also clarified that the Amendment does not enshrine “a right to keep and carry
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”49 It
then made clear that, among other potentially legitimate gun regulations, “nothing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”50
The second recent, watershed case in the Second Amendment field is
McDonald v. City of Chicago.51 In this case, a plurality of the Court held that the
Second Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.52 This case, in its practical effect, even if not in form,
abrogated Cruikshank and Presser insofar as those cases had explicitly held that the
Second Amendment did not constrain state action, and McDonald explicitly has
established the opposite.
B.

Issues Which Heller Left Unanswered

While Heller provides some guidance in interpreting the Second
Amendment under the Court’s new framework, many questions remain unanswered
in its wake. For instance, the Court has not yet answered what level of scrutiny should
apply to Second Amendment regulations.53 Additional questions include exactly
what kinds of “arms” will fall within the protection of the Amendment, in what kinds
of places should the right be given greater sanctity, and how protected arms may and
may not be carried or stored.54 These issues deserve thoughtful answers. Much
scholarship only briefly analyzes state constitutional provisions and case law with an
eye to how it could inform these questions.55 Thus, in the next Part, we discuss how
46. Id. at 592.
47. 307 U.S. 174.
48. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625–26 (noting also that this observation is consistent with early state court
interpretations of the right to bear arms).
49. Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (referencing early Nineteenth Century state cases).
50. Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
51. 561 U.S. 742, 749–50, 767–69, 778 (2010).
52. See id. at 805–807 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (preferring
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the vehicle of incorporation, but
arriving at the same legal conclusion).
53. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 629 & n.27 (refraining from applying any particular level of
scrutiny, reasoning that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights, [the ordinances at sue] would fail constitutional muster”).
54. See id. at 626–27, 627 n.26, 720–22 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Cornell & DeDino, supra note 5, at 525 (“Modern Second Amendment scholarship and
recent jurisprudence have devoted considerable energy to debating the individual or collective nature of
this right. Hardly any attention has been devoted to elaborating a functional Second Amendment
jurisprudence.”); Winkler, supra note 16, at 597 (“The debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment
has focused primarily on a first-order question: does the amendment protect an individual right to bear
arms or a collective right of states to maintain militias free from federal interference?”); see also, e.g.,
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consulting state constitutions and their authoritative interpretations can help answer
some of these questions and thereby inform future interpretations of the Second
Amendment.
III.
A.

THE LESSONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Level of Scrutiny that State Courts Have Applied under State
Constitutions to the Right to Bear Arms

The first issue we explore is the level of scrutiny that should apply to
regulations under the Second Amendment. The vast majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the same standard on regulating firearms: they will uphold “reasonable
regulations” designed to protect the public safety and welfare. Forty-three states have
a right-to-bear-arms provision that protects an individual right in their state
constitutions.56 Over half of these states have expressly adopted the reasonable
regulation test; this test is articulated differently in different jurisdictions.57 At least
Kopel, supra note 3, at 847–49 (focusing mainly on whether state constitutions indicate that the right to
bear arms is individual versus collective); George A. Nation III, The New Constitutional Right to Guns:
Exploring the Illegitimate Birth and Acceptable Limitations of this New Right, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 353
(2009) (addressing the possible level of scrutiny to be applied, the scope of the term “arms,” and place
restrictions on the right, but without substantial consideration of state constitutional analysis and reasoning
with respect to these issues); Volokh, supra note 3, at 810–11 (speculating briefly about “[w]hat arms
may be kept and borne” under the Second Amendment); Nitz, supra note 5, at 324–28 (arguing that state
constitutions are not relevant to the Second Amendment).
56. See infra Appendix, Table 3. Two additional states, namely Maryland and Massachusetts, have
provisions regulating militias and/or the right to bear arms, but have held that this does not include an
individual right. See Scherr v. Handgun Permit Review Bd., 880 A.2d 1137, 1156 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2005); Commonwealth v. Depina, 922 N.E.2d 778, 790 (Mass. 2010) (“There is no right under . . . [the]
Massachusetts Constitution for a private citizen to keep and bear arms. . . . “ (quoting Chief of Police v.
Moyer, 453 N.E.2d 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983))); see also infra Appendix, Table 3.
57. See Hyde v. Birmingham, 392 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (“It is well-settled . . .
that this right of a citizen to bear arms in defense of himself and the state is subject to reasonable
regulation. . . . “); City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207, 213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Dano v.
Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)); Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 328–31
(Colo. 1994) (holding that the trial court erred in reviewing ordinance regulating the exercise of the right
to bear arms under the strict scrutiny standard the right to bear arms may be regulated by the state under
its police power in a reasonable manner); People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 390–31 (Colo. 1975) (“When
rights come into conflict, one must of necessity yield. The conflicting rights involved here are the
individual’s right to bear arms and the state’s right . . . to make reasonable regulations for the purpose of
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the people.”); Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1232
(Conn. 1995); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 493 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that the right to
bear arms is subject to reasonable exercise of governmental power); Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661,
666 (Fla. 1972) (holding that “the right to keep and bear arms is . . . subject to the right of the people . . .
to enact valid police regulations to promote the health, morals, safety and general welfare of the people”);
Carson v. State, 247 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 1978) (holding that the question in each case being “whether the
particular regulation involved is legitimate and reasonably within the police power, or whether it is
arbitrary, and, under the name of regulation, amounts to a deprivation of the constitutional right” to keep
and bear arms); State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 368 (Haw. 1996) (holding that “the right to bear arms
may be regulated by the state in a reasonable manner”), overruling on other grounds recognized in Lowe
v. Kealoha, No. 28973, 2010 Haw. App. LEXIS 866, at *2 n.3 (Dec. 22, 2010); Matthews v. State, 148
N.E.2d 334, 338 (Ind. 1958) (applying the reasonable regulation test to the right to bear arms); Redington
v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 179 (Ky.
2006) (“[W]e find nothing to support [the] suggestion that . . . [the state right to bear arms provision]
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divests the legislature of power to reasonably regulate the area of firearms possession.”); State v. Brown,
571 A.2d 816, 817 (Me. 1990) (holding that the State was entitled to reasonably regulate possession and
use of firearms); People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a gun control
statute as “a reasonable . . . exercise” of governmental power); James v. State, 97-CA-01497-STC (¶ 9),
731 So. 2d 1135 (Miss. 1999) (applying the reasonable regulation standard and finding the challenged
statute “constitutional as a reasonable exercise of police power”); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 598
(Neb. 1989) (holding that “reasonable regulation of the possession of arms is not prohibited by the [right
to bear arms] amendment”); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 927 A.2d 1216, 1223 (N.H. 2007); State
v. Rivera, 1993-NMCA-011, ¶ 7, 853 P.2d 126 (“An act is within the state’s police power if it is reasonably
related to the public health, welfare, and safety.” (quoting People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 228, 230 (Colo.
1979))), abrogated by State v. Murillo, 2015-NMCA-046, 347 P.3d 284; State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1,
9, 10 (N.C. 1968) (“The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute” and “a citizen’s right to carry
arms is subject to reasonable regulation.”); State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(“[W]e hold that this regulation is reasonable and bears a fair relation to the preservation of the public
peace and safety.”); State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 1987) (“Instead, we believe our
Constitution’s protection of the right to keep and bear arms is not absolute; although it prevents the
negation of the right to keep and bear arms, that right nevertheless remains subject to reasonable
regulation. . . . “); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 172 (Ohio 1993) (“[T]he right to bear
arms is not an unlimited right and is subject to reasonable regulation. . . . “); State ex rel. Okla. State
Bureau of Investigation v. Warren, 1998 OK 133, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d 900, 902–903 (“An individual’s right to
keep and bear arms under [the North Dakota] Constitution is not absolute, but remains subject to
reasonable regulation. . . . “); State v. Christian, 307 P.3d 429, 437 (Or. 2013) (“We have consistently
acknowledged the legislature’s authority to enact reasonable regulations to promote public safety as long
as the enactment does not unduly frustrate the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense
as guaranteed by Article I, section 27.”); Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004) (“[T]he right
to possess a handgun, whether a fundamental liberty interest or not, is not absolute and is subject to
reasonable regulation.”); Wilson v. State, 44 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that a gun
regulation did not unconstitutionally violate the right to keep and bear arms because it bore a rational
relation to the valid state interest in preventing crime); City of Seattle v. Montana, 919 P.2d 1218, 1223
(Wash. 1996) (“We have consistently held that the right to bear arms in art. I, § 24 is not absolute, but
instead is subject to ‘reasonable regulation’ by the State. . . . “ (quoting Morris v. Blaker, 821 P.2d 482
(Wash. 1992))); Rohrbaugh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 404, 413–14 (W. Va. 2004) (“The West Virginia
legislature may, through the valid exercise of its police power, reasonably regulate the right of a person
to keep and bear arms in order to promote the health, safety and welfare of all citizens of this State. . . .
[and upholding the challenged statute because] [t]he restrictions contained therein are a proper exercise
of the Legislature’s police power to protect the citizenry of this State and impose reasonable limitations
on the right to keep and bear arms to achieve this end.”); State ex rel. Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d
139, 146 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that the right to bear arms is not absolute and is subject to reasonable
regulation); State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 337 (Wis. 2003) (finding the right to keep and bear arms to
be a fundamental constitutional right, but rejecting a strict scrutiny analysis in favor of a reasonableness
test: “[T]he proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.”); State v.
Thomas, 683 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he right to bear arms is a qualified right, subject
to reasonable restrictions under the state’s police power.”); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 872 (Wyo.
1982) (holding that the “statute [at issue,] which has for its purpose the prevention of the use of firearms
in connection with violent crimes[,] is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state and is not
unreasonable”); see also State v. Rupp, 282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979) (interpreting the federal Second
Amendment as a right subject to reasonable regulation); People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927, 928 (Mich.
1922) (recognizing under Michigan’s right to bear arms “the right of the legislature, under the police
power, to regulate the carrying of firearms”); In re Application of Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.
1980) (finding that even if the state constitution protects some kind of non-enumerated right to bear arms,
that right to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulations); State v. Angelo, 130 A. 458, 459 (N.J. 1925)
(same); State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting application of strict
scrutiny to this right and holding that “[t]he right to keep and bear arms afforded by the North Carolina
Constitution is subject to regulations which are ‘reasonable and not prohibitive’ and which ‘bear a fair
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six other states have implicitly applied this standard without expressly saying so.58
Further, at least seven more states have not yet adopted any discernable standard at
all.59 Just four states have adopted a different standard: two have adopted
intermediate scrutiny, and two have recently adopted strict scrutiny.60 Notably, both
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Eberhardt and other recent cases and the Missouri
Supreme Court in Merritt upheld the gun control regulations at issue as passing strict
scrutiny, which suggests that these courts have applied a more lenient version of
strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms than to other rights.61 The Louisiana Supreme
Court found that “a long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense”
were enough to pass constitutional muster.62 Indeed, the Court expressly adopted a
reasonable regulation rationale and looked to other reasonable regulation
jurisdictions in supporting its holding: “We are satisfied that it is reasonable for the
legislature in the interest of public welfare and safety to regulate the possession of
relation to the preservation of the public peace and safety’” (quoting State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989))).
58. Jones v. City of Little Rock, 862 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ark. 1993); State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72, 73
(Idaho 1945); Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1151–52 (Kan. 1979) (“Once a subject is found to
be within the scope of the state’s police power, the only limitations upon the exercise of such power are
that the regulations must have reference in fact to the welfare of society and must be fairly designed to
protect the public against the evils which might otherwise occur. . . . [T]he fixed rule and basic standard
by which the validity of all exercises of the police power is tested is that the police power of the state
extends only to such measures as are reasonable and that all police regulation must be reasonable under
all circumstances.”); Minich v. County of Jefferson, 919 A.2d 356, 361 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (applying
the reasonable regulation standard); State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714, 716 (1878) (upholding a gun control
law, stating, “[These acts,] which have been passed for the suppression of the . . . dangerous practice of
carrying arms, . . . do not in fact abridge, the constitutional right” to bear arms, because they were “passed
with a view ‘to prevent crime.’”); State v. Duranleau, 260 A.2d 383, 386 (Vt. 1969) (holding that “the
right to bear arms is [not] unlimited and undefinable” and finding a gun control statute valid because it
had a reasonable purpose, stemming from the legislature’s “power to deal with matters of public morals,
health, safety and welfare”).
59. See, e.g., James v. Musselshell County, No. DV-95-74, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 737, at *3 (Dec.
11, 1998) (“Although citizens of this country may have some right to bear arms, exercise of this right is
not without limitation.”); State v. Bolin, 662 S.E.2d 38, 39 n.2 (S.C. 2008) (citing to cases applying the
reasonable regulation standard); State v. Johnson, 56 S.E. 544, 545 (S.C. 1907) (finding that the city
counsel acted within the police power in enacting the gun control ordinance at issue); State v. Willis, 100
P.3d 1218, 1222 (Utah 2004) (holding that the legislature has “authority to . . . regulate the lawful ‘use’
of arms” under the state constitution); Digiacinto v. Rector of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 368–
70 (Va. 2011) (upholding a gun control law without articulating the level of scrutiny applied); infra
Appendix, Table 3 (documenting that neither Nevada nor South Dakota have established a standard).
Illinois also has not yet settled on a standard. Compare City of Chicago v. Taylor, 774 N.E.2d 22, 29 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002) (applying rational basis review), with People v. Montyce H., 2011 IL App (1st) 101788, ¶
31, 959 N.E.2d 221 (applying intermediate scrutiny), appeal denied, judgment vacated, 4 N.E.3d 1112
(Ill. 2014), abrogated by People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, 2 N.E.3d 321.
60. See Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (ALASKA CT. APP. 1997) (intermediate scrutiny); Doe
v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 88 A.3d 654, 666 (Del. 2014) (intermediate scrutiny); State v. Eberhardt,
2013-2306, p. 5 (La. 7/1/14), 145 So. 3d 377, 381 (strict scrutiny); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 810
(Mo. 2015) (strict scrutiny).
61. Eberhardt, 2013-2306, p. 12; State v. Webb, 2013-1681, pp. 17–18 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So. 3d 971,
977; State In re J.M., 2013-1717, p. 13 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So. 3d 853, 863; State v. Draughter, 2013-0914,
p. 17 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So. 3d 855, 867; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 816.
62. Eberhardt, 2013-2306, p. 12 (quoting State In re J.M., 2013-1717, p. 9 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So. 3d
853, 861).
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firearms, for a limited period of time, by citizens who have committed certain
specified serious felonies. Courts of other states having statutes and constitutional
provisions comparable to our own have similarly concluded that such regulation is
constitutionally permissible as a reasonable and legitimate exercise of police
power.”63 As the only four states among 43 to adopt intermediate or strict scrutiny,
these two standards are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, their application
is even more extreme when one considers that four states do not regulate gun control
legislation at all under their state constitutions, making the reasonable regulation
standard the balance between these two extreme positions. It is therefore
unsurprising that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have adopted any
standard have adopted the reasonable regulation standard.64 Thus, the dozens of
states applying the reasonable regulation standard represent the predominant judicial
approach based on the broad experience of these states.65
The reasonable regulation standard takes on slightly different meanings in
different jurisdictions. In the majority of jurisdictions that have explained the
meaning of this test, legislation is permissible insofar as it bears a rational
relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.66 In contrast, at least
one jurisdiction, Rhode Island, states the test as “whether the statute is a reasonable
limitation of the right to bear arms, rather than a reasonable means of promoting the

63. Id.
64. David Kopel and Clayton Cramer, two scholars who have also reviewed this issue, incorrectly
suggest that “[s]tate courts [generally] have applied various techniques of strict scrutiny to the right to
arms.” David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1116, 1119 (2010). However, their article, which preceded
the recent adoptions in Missouri and Louisiana, cited only to four jurisdictions, Kansas, West Virginia,
Oregon, and Colorado, all of which actually apply the reasonable regulation standard, either implicitly or
explicitly. Compare id. at 1116 n.13 (referring to the “cases discussed at notes 265–66, 450–55, 483, 523–
30,” which refer to cases from four jurisdictions: Kansas, West Virginia, Oregon, and Colorado), with
supra notes 58 and 59; infra Appendix, Table 3 (entries for Colorado, Kansas, Oregon, and West
Virginia). Their sweeping conclusion is thus unsupported.
65. See generally Winkler, supra note 16, at 597–602 (discussing the trend towards states adopting
the reasonable regulation standard).
66. State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 368 (Haw. 1996) (“The appropriate inquiry is whether [the
statute] bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.”), overruling on other grounds
recognized in Lowe v. Kealoha, 2010 Haw. App. LEXIS 866 (Dec. 22, 2010); Redington v. State, 922
N.E.2d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 181 (Ky. 2006) (holding
that “reasonable regulation” means not irrational or arbitrary); State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 820–21
(Me. 1990) (applying a rational relationship standard in applying the reasonable regulation test); James v.
State, 97-CA-01497-SCT (¶ 9), 731 So. 2d 1135 (Miss. 1999) (recognizing the state’s power to regulate
weapons as “the right of government to promote public health, safety, morals, general welfare, peace, and
order, and public comfort and convenience”); State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(rejecting application of strict scrutiny to this right and holding that “[t]he right to keep and bear arms
afforded by the North Carolina Constitution is subject to regulations which are ‘reasonable and not
prohibitive’ and which ‘bear a fair relation to the preservation of the public peace and safety.’” (quoting
State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989))); State ex rel. Okla. State Bureau of
Investigation v. Warren, 1998 OK 133, ¶ 16, 975 P.2d 900, 903 (holding that “[e]xercise of the state’s
police power must be upheld unless it bears no relation to public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare”); Wilson v. State, 44 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that a statute did not
unconstitutionally violate the right to keep and bear arms because it bore a rational relation to the valid
state interest in preventing crime).
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public welfare.”67 Finally, at least a few jurisdictions have combined these two
standards, providing that “the reasonableness test focuses on the balance of the
interests at stake, rather than merely on whether any conceivable rationale exists
under which the legislature may have concluded the law could promote the public
welfare.”68 In these jurisdictions, the question is both whether the law (1) “promotes
public safety, health or welfare” and (2) “bears a reasonable and substantial relation
to accomplishing the purpose pursued.”69 Regardless of which variation a given state
employs, most jurisdictions grant substantial deference to the legislature’s judgment
in enacting the regulation at issue.70
Kopel and Cramer criticize those reasonable regulation cases that have
applied a rational relationship test in enforcing the reasonable regulation standard as
“unhelpful” because they involve “‘balancing . . . [,]’” reasoning that they do not
provide “any standards” for what makes a regulation reasonable, or how courts
should balance the interests at issue.71 They also suggest that balancing is
67. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004).
68. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 27, 665 N.W.2d 328; accord Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616
N.E.2d 163, 172 n.12 (Ohio 1993) (“[W]e believe that reasonable gun control legislation is that which is
fair, proper, moderate, suitable under the circumstances and not excessive.”); City of Seattle v. Montana,
919 P.2d 1218, 1222–23, 1224 (Wash. 1996).
69. Montana, 919 P.2d at 1222–23.
70. See Winkler, supra note 16, at 598, 599, 602; see also, e.g., Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St. 3d 537,
2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶ 14 (“In reviewing the reasonableness of [legislation], we are guided
by certain principles. It is not a court’s function to pass judgment on the wisdom of the legislation, for
that is the task of the legislative body which enacted the legislation. Further, unless there is a clear and
palpable abuse of power, a court will not substitute its judgment for legislative discretion.” (quoting
Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 172–73 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
71. Kopel & Cramer, supra note 64, at 1116 n.17. They cite to four cases to support this proposition,
but each of these four cases fails to provide anything but the weakest support for their sweeping critique.
For example, the first case on which they rely, Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120, 140–41 (1879), did not involve
a challenge to a law under any right to bear arms provision. The court made clear that nobody argued that
“the act in question contravene[d] any provision of [the Illinois] constitution,” see id. at 124, and the only
U.S. Constitutional provisions raised were Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, granting Congress power to
organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and Article I, Section 10, Clause 2. See id. at 125, 138; see also
id. at 124, 125, 131, 138 (identifying the only two grounds raised to challenge the legislation as (1) a U.S.
constitutional provision and (2) a federal statute, and then analyzing the law in light of (1) Article I,
Section 8, Clause 15 of the U.S. Constitution, (2) federal law regulating militias, and (3) Article I, Section
10, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution). The court also made clear that nobody argued that the statutory
provision making it unlawful for men to organize and parade with arms without a license was “in conflict
with any paramount law of the United States,” and consequently the validity of the provision “pertain[ed]
alone to [the state’s] domestic polity.” See id. at 140. It then very specifically declared that “[t]he right of
the citizen to ‘bear arms’ for the defense of his person and property is not involved, even remotely, in this
discussion.” Id. The discussion that followed then analyzed whether the state had ex ante power as a matter
of policy to enact the statute, and the language quoted by Kopel and Cramer came from this part of the
court’s discussion. Consequently, the language quoted by Kopel and Cramer quite obviously has no
relation to establishing the level of scrutiny as applied to the right to bear arms, and thus any concerns
about the breadth of this language are irrelevant to this question.
The second case on which they rely, People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of City Prison, 139 N.Y.S. 277
(App. Div. 1913), is also irrelevant for at least two reasons. First, it comes out of a jurisdiction, New York,
that has no state right to bear arms provision. Second, this case did not purport to apply the reasonable
regulation test. It considered the validity of the challenged law against a state statute, the Civil Rights
Law, under which it identified a right to keep and bear arms. See id. at 284. It held that under Presser v.
Illinois, gun control regulations should stand unless the regulation had the effect of wholly “prohibit[ing]
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inappropriate under Heller because the Heller majority “found interest balancing” to
be inappropriate, reasoning that no core enumerated right is subject to balancing.72
Yet, the Heller majority made clear that it was not referring to any of the usual levels
of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis, but rather were
referring to a different kind of test where a judge, “on a case-by-case basis,” asks
“whether the statute burdens a protected interest . . . to an extent that is out of
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental
interests.”73 Of course even the traditional levels of scrutiny such as strict scrutiny
involve balancing (e.g. whether a compelling governmental interest exists and the
law is narrowly tailored to produce the least infringement possible such that the
interest “outweighs” the infringement on rights). Consequently, the reasonable
regulation test cannot be condemned on the basis that it involves balancing, because
any level of scrutiny would require as much. Instead, Heller should be read in a much
more common-sense manner as rejecting the applicability of case-by-case balancing
that provides no guidance about what standards must be satisfied for courts to find
that the balance strikes in favor of one party rather than the other.74
the people from keeping and bearing arms. . . . “ Id. It then applied this Presser test and found that “[i]n
the statute at bar the Legislature ha[d] not prohibited the keeping of arms,” but rather had merely regulated
this right. Id. at 285 (“[T]he Legislature has passed a regulative, not a prohibitory, act.”). Thus, this case
does not illustrate the application of the reasonable relationship test, and consequently is irrelevant.
Finally, on its own terms this case law does not apply a “vague” standard “without providing any standards
for what makes something reasonable,” Kopel & Cramer, supra note 64, at 1116, but rather made the
standard clear: regulations are permissible, prohibitions are not. While the Court in Heller may have
rejected that distinction, this does not bring into question the general body of case law applying the
reasonable regulation test because People ex rel. Darling itself does not apply this reasonable regulation
test, but rather applies the test established in Presser.
The third case to which they cite, Dunston v. State, 27 So. 333, 334 (Ala. 1900), contains two brief
paragraphs. Nowhere is any right to bear arms provision mentioned in this opinion. See id. at 334. Rather,
the court appeared to be analyzing the scope of the statute, rather than applying a level of scrutiny to
determine whether the statute comported with some constitutional provision. See id. Thus, this case too
sheds no light on the workability of the reasonable regulation standard.
Finally, Kopel and Cramer cite to Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872), the only case actually analyzing
the validity of a regulation under a state constitutional right to bear arms provision. This case indeed does
implicitly apply the reasonable regulation test, using the language of “regulations . . . necessary for the
good of society. . . . “ Id. Kopel and Cramer criticize this court mostly for the brevity of its analysis.
However, many early cases issued brief opinions in disposing of cases. A more serious critique would
look at modern case law applying the reasonable regulation test, and ask whether that case law provides
clear guidelines with respect to how this test should apply. We think the three variations on the reasonable
regulation test, laid out above in this Part, are as clear as any of the three traditional levels of scrutiny:
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Thus, we find this concern unconvincing, and
entirely unsupported.
72. Kopel & Cramer, supra note 64, at 1117 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 553 U.S. 570, 634
(2008)).
73. Heller, 533 U.S. at 634.
74. The balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) provides one illustration
of such a case-by-case balancing test. In contrast to Mathews, under the reasonable regulation standard,
the courts have made clear that the balance weighs categorically in favor of upholding gun control
regulation at least as long as the regulation forwards a proper purpose (i.e. health, safety, or welfare) and
the scope of the regulation bears a “reasonable relationship” to that purpose. Such a construction bears a
much closer resemblance to traditional level of scrutiny analysis than to an ad hoc Mathews balancing
assessment. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook recently adopted this approach to analyzing a firearm regulation
in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]nstead of trying to
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The Colorado Court of Appeals recently recognized this in rejecting the
very argument advanced by Kopel and Cramer. In Rocky Mt. Gun Owners v.
Hickenlooper, 2016 COA 45M, 2016 Colo. App. LEXIS 524, at *5232-33 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2016), the Rocky Mountain Gun Owners and National Association for Gun
Rights also argued that Heller and McDonald prohibited application of traditional
“police power” review of newly enacted gun regulation. The Court rejected these
argument reasoning that “[n]ot all restrictions on fundamental rights are analyzed
under a strict scrutiny standard of review.” The court then observed that “[i]n neither
Heller nor McDonald did a majority of the United States Supreme Court identify a
particular standard under which the validity of restrictions on the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms would be assessed. Other states in which the right
to bear arms is recognized as a ‘fundamental’ right under their state constitutions
analyze restrictions on that right under the Robertson ‘reasonable exercise of police
power’ test.”
A final concern with considering the applicability of this case law to the
Second Amendment is that the Heller majority indicated in a footnote that traditional
rational basis scrutiny, under which laws may be upheld as long as they forward any
conceivable rational state interest, would be an inappropriate level of scrutiny for
laws and actions that infringe on the Second Amendment.75 While the first variation
of the reasonable regulation level of scrutiny might ultimately be rejected by the
Court if it follows this path when it squarely faces this issue, the second two iterations
of this level of scrutiny require substantially more than a showing that a law forwards
some conceivable government interest. Thus, this observation provides no real
obstacle to considering this powerful trend.
1.

Why the Comparison between the Second Amendment and State
Right-to-Bear-Arms Provisions is Apt

There are multiple reasons why originalists and non-originalists alike
should take this precedent seriously. First, the comparison between the state and
federal provisions is apt because the state and federal provisions alike share features
that are key to the level of scrutiny determination, including the kind of scrutiny
applied to other fundamental rights, the recognized importance of the right to bear
arms, and the governmental interests involved that might counsel in favor of one
kind of level of scrutiny versus another.
Turning to the first feature, the states that adopted the reasonable regulation
standard of review for the right to bear arms are overwhelmingly jurisdictions that
apply strict scrutiny to other rights enshrined in their state constitutions.76 Thus, these

decide what “level” of scrutiny applies, and how it works, inquiries that do not resolve any concrete
dispute, we think it better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of
ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia,’ . . . and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.”)
75. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
76. In this footnote we identify at least one case from every jurisdiction that applies the reasonable
regulation standard (implicitly or explicitly) which acknowledges that strict scrutiny applies to other rights
under that jurisdiction’s state constitution. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 157, 159
(Ala. 1993) (holding that the right to education constitutes a fundamental right and further holding
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“[b]ecause education is a fundamental right under the Alabama constitution, the stark inequities in
educational opportunity offered schoolchildren in this state must be justified under strict scrutiny by a
compelling state interest to pass constitutional muster”); Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 971, 975
(Ariz. 1984) (identifying the state constitutional right to recover damages for bodily injury as a
fundamental right and holding that it consequently was subject to “strict scrutiny”); State v. Brown, 156
S.W.3d 722, 731 (Ark. 2004) (recognizing a fundamental right to privacy in the home implicit in the
Arkansas Constitution and applying strict scrutiny to that right); Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 341 (Colo. 1994); Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990
A.2d 206, 233 (Conn. 2008) (“[I]n Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any
infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.” (quoting Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373
(Conn. 1977))); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1109–10 (Fla. 2004) (finding the state constitutional rights
to privacy and freedom of movement to be fundamental and applying strict scrutiny to laws that impaired
the exercise of these rights); Fair v. State, 702 S.E.2d 420, (Ga. 2010) (applying strict scrutiny under the
state’s equal protection clause); McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 799 P.2d 953, 956–57 (Haw. 1990)
(recognizing that under the state constitutional right to privacy, government action that infringes on this
right must meet strict scrutiny); Cummings v. Roth, No. 28272, 2009 Haw. App. LEXIS 780, at *21–24
(Dec. 22, 2009) (same); G.B. v. Dearborn Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1031–32
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that under the Indiana Constitution, infringement on fundamental rights
protected by the Due Process Clause are subject to strict scrutiny); Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853
P.2d 669, 675–77 (Kan. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny under the equal protection component of the
Kansas Constitution); D.F. v. Codell, 127 S.W.3d 571, 575–77 (Ky. 2003) (acknowledging that the right
to an adequate education is a fundamental right under the Kentucky Constitution and that strict scrutiny
applies to laws that infringe upon the exercise of this right, but finding no such infringement by the statute
at bar); State v. Maine State Troopers Ass’n., 491 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1985) (acknowledging that the right
of free expression is a fundamental right under Maine’s constitution and is subject to strict scrutiny);
Musto v. Redford Twp., 357 N.W.2d 791, 792–93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (identifying the right to travel
as a fundamental right under both the state and Federal Constitution and recognizing that strict scrutiny
applies to the right); Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Bureau, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Neb. 1986)
(acknowledging that the relationship between the parent and child is protected under the Nebraska and
federal constitutions, and that infringements on this right are subject to strict scrutiny); Lamarche v.
McCarthy, 965 A.2d 992, 999 (N.H. 2008) (declaring that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right
under the New Hampshire Constitution, and burdens on that right are subject to strict scrutiny); N.M.
Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 36–43, 975 P.2d 841 (applying strict scrutiny,
labeled a “searching judicial inquiry,” to the fundamental right to equal treatment based on gender under
New Mexico’s Equal Rights Amendment); King v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 263 (N.C.
2010) (acknowledging that strict scrutiny applies to some infringements on the fundamental right to an
adequate education under North Carolina’s constitution); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393
(N.C. 2002) (stating that the right to vote is a fundamental right under the North Carolina Constitution
and applying strict scrutiny to an infringement on this right); Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d
285 (holding that under North Dakota’s Constitution, parents enjoy a fundamental right to care and
custody of their children and infringements on this right are subject to strict scrutiny); Sorrell v. Thevenir,
633 N.E.2d 504, 510–11 (Ohio 1994) (applying strict scrutiny to a law that infringed on the state
constitutional fundamental right to a jury trial in certain civil cases); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund
Corp., 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982) (striking down a gender-biased statute under the state constitution’s equal
rights clause by finding that the statute targeted a suspect class and consequently merited strict scrutiny);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 802–803 (Pa. 1992) (acknowledging right to privacy
as protected under the Pennsylvania Constitution and applying strict scrutiny to an infringement on this
right); DiStefano v. Haxton, C.A. No. WC 92-0589, 1994 WL 931006, at *4, *8 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12,
1994) (reviewing jurisprudence under the Rhode Island Constitution’s Substantive Due Process Clause,
identifying the right of unrelated individuals to live together as a fundamental right under this constitution,
and acknowledging that infringements on this right are subject to strict scrutiny); Planned Parenthood of
Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 7–8, 11–12, 15–16 (Tenn. 2000) (holding under the Tennessee
Constitution that the fundamental right to privacy included a right to abortion that was subject to strict
scrutiny); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390, 396 (Vt. 1997) (identifying the right to education as
“integral” to Vermont’s form of state government and concluding that laws that infringe upon this state
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state constitutions are similarly situated to the federal Constitution insofar as our
courts apply strict and intermediate scrutiny to many of the federal Constitution’s
other fundamental rights. Among these jurisdictions applying strict scrutiny to other
rights, but not to the right to bear arms, some have explicitly considered the argument
that strict or intermediate scrutiny should also apply to the right to bear arms, and
have rejected this argument on the ground that the right to bear arms is a unique right
that demands a different standard of review. Because these conclusions are
thoughtful and well reasoned, these cases have significant reason-borrowing value,
and jurists should take them seriously.
For example, in choosing to apply a reasonableness standard rather than
strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned
that “[n]ot every restriction of a right classified as fundamental incurs ‘strict’
scrutiny.”77 This observation readily extends to federal constitutional rights too.78

constitutional right “bear[] a . . . heavy burden of justification” and is subject to a “searching scrutiny”
equivalent to strict scrutiny analysis, but striking down the law regardless of the level of scrutiny because
it failed to satisfy even rational basis review); Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 1997) (applying
strict scrutiny to an ordinance that allegedly infringed on free exercise rights under the Washington
Constitution); State ex rel. Boley v. Tennant, 724 S.E.2d 783, 788 & n.11 (W. Va. 2012) (acknowledging
that under the West Virginia Constitution the right to become a candidate for public office is a fundamental
right and constitutionally suspect infringements on that right was analyzed under strict scrutiny); Vincent
v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶¶ 3, 81, 83, 614 N.W.2d 388 (reaffirming that the right to an equal opportunity
for a sound basic education constitutes a fundamental right under the Wisconsin Constitution and
acknowledging that infringements on that right, as opposed to the wealth-based classifications at issue,
would be reviewed under strict scrutiny); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (Wis. 1976) (also holding
that the right to equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right under the Wisconsin Constitution
and subjecting a classification that infringed on that right to strict scrutiny); see also Leliefeld v. Johnson,
659 P.2d 111, 126–27 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging under a challenge to both the federal and state equal
protection clauses that strict scrutiny applies to fundamental rights); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial
Performance v. Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 7 n.1), 876 So.2d 1006 (Miss. 2004) (acknowledging
that the analysis under the federal and state freedom of speech provisions the analysis would be the same
and that under both constitutions, infringements on the freedom of speech must withstand strict scrutiny);
LaTray v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2001 OK CIV APP 92, 28 P.3d 1163 (applying strict
scrutiny to infringements on the fundamental right of parents to the care and custody of their children as
protected by both the state and federal constitutions); HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ.
Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, (Tex. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny under both the federal First
Amendment and the Texas Constitution’s free exercise clause to legislation that targeted religious
practices); EBH v. Hot Springs Dep’t of Family Servs., 33 P.3d 172, 178 (Wyo. 2001) (identifying the
right to associate with one’s family as a fundamental right under both the U.S. Constitution and
Wyoming’s Constitution and identifying strict scrutiny as the proper test for assessing infringements on
this right). We opted to cite these last five jurisdictions separately for the sake of clarity because these
cases applied strict scrutiny to rights under both the state and federal constitutional frameworks, rather
than under just their state constitution.
77. Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 927 A.2d 1216, 1221 (N.H. 2007) (quoting Richard H.
Fallon, Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 315 (1993)).
78. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, (1983) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting), (observing that where the impact of a regulation does not sufficiently burden a right, then
we do not apply strict scrutiny to the challenged law or act), overruled by Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992); Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment,
105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688 (2007) (noting that “[m]ost provisions in the Bill of Rights do not trigger
strict scrutiny, and the oft-repeated linkage between fundamental rights and strict scrutiny is more rhetoric
than doctrinal reality”).
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The New Hampshire Court further reasoned that “[s]trict scrutiny, with its
presumption of unconstitutionality, is a standard of review traditionally used in areas
where courts deem any burdensome legislation to be ‘immediately suspect.’”79 It
contrasted such legislation with gun control laws, which, “with [their] legislative
motivation of public safety . . . is not inherently suspicious.”80 We have applied
similar reasoning in justifying applying a level of scrutiny other than strict scrutiny
to fundamental rights under the federal Constitution.81
Turning to the second shared feature, at least some states applying the
reasonable regulation test, like the Supreme Court in Heller, have held that their state
right-to-bear-arms provisions protect a fundamental right.82 Again, because state
courts have carefully analyzed why the importance of the right did not dictate
application of strict or intermediate scrutiny, these cases have weighty reasonborrowing value that courts should consider. For example, in applying the reasonable
relationship standard to the fundamental right to bear arms, the Ohio Supreme Court
relied in part on the long tradition of gun control legislation in concluding that the
reasonable relationship test was the proper standard of review for this unique right.83
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also relied on the “long history of weapons
regulations,” which, it concluded, indicated that “such laws are not inherently
invidious.”84 These considerations are important and should be persuasive under an
originalist analysis.85
Finally, with respect to the third shared feature, the same kinds of
governmental interests are implicated by the Second Amendment and state
79. Bleiler, 927 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Winkler, supra note 16, at 599).
80. See id. at 1222.
81. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (justifying the “undue burden” level of scrutiny rather than a
strict scrutiny standard of review because “[t]he very notion that the State has a substantial interest in
potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens
on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden
standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally
protected liberty.”).
82. See, e.g., Rabbit v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 491 (Conn. 1979); Bleiler, 927 A.2d at 1219–23
(assuming without deciding that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right and then applying the
reasonableness test rather than strict scrutiny); Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St. 3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795
N.E.2d 633, at ¶¶ 7–15 (recognizing “the right to bear arms [as] fundamental,” but applying the
“reasonable regulation” standard to the gun control legislation); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 23, 264
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (finding the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional
right, but rejecting a strict scrutiny analysis in favor of a reasonableness test: “[T]he proper question is
whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.”); see also Robertson v. City of Denver, 874
P.2d 325, 330 n.10 (Colo. 1994) (holding that the trial court erred in reviewing an ordinance regulating
the exercise of the right to bear arms under the strict scrutiny standard; providing that the right to bear
arms may be regulated by the state under its police power in a reasonable manner); State v. Whitaker, 689
S.E.2d 395, 400–402 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting application of strict scrutiny to this right); Mosby v.
Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004) (holding that “the right to possess a handgun, whether a
fundamental liberty interest or not, is not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulation”).
83. Klein, 2003-Ohio-4779, at ¶¶ 12–15.
84. Bleiler, 927 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 597, 600 (2006)).
85. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 828 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part)
(“When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most likely public understanding of a
particular provision at the time it was adopted.”); Greenberg & Litman, supra note 23, at 574–77.
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provisions regarding the right-to-bear-arms, namely concerns for public safety. The
federal government has articulated its serious concern for the potential dangers of
guns through previous legislation that it has enacted, for example the Gun Free
School Zones Act.86 If the “compelling interest” standard is to mean anything, then
it must include the federal and state governmental interest in regulating activities that
carry a great risk of life-threatening injuries and death in our society. Further, many
state courts have explicitly considered this governmental interest in deciding to apply
the reasonable regulation standard to this fundamental right. For example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the argument that strict scrutiny, or even
intermediate scrutiny, should apply to the right to bear arms because of the
fundamental nature of the right; it explained that application of the reasonable
regulation standard was justified by compelling “interests of public safety” and the
fact that other jurisdictions overwhelmingly also apply the reasonable regulation
test.87 Other jurisdictions have echoed the concern regarding the compelling public
interest in regulating the use of weapons.88 Thus, because the Second Amendment
involves the same key features as state provisions regarding the right to bear arms,
courts should take seriously the well-reasoned opinions that have held the reasonable
regulation standard applicable to this right.
A skeptic might argue that the federal government is fundamentally
different from state governments insofar as the federal government does not have the
broad police power that states enjoy, but rather is a limited government of
enumerated powers.89 The authors acknowledge that this argument may carry some
force as applied to now merely academic question answered in Heller of whether the
Second Amendment protects a right to self-defense.90
However, we identify three reasons why this argument does not apply more
broadly to the general relevance of any state right-to-bear-arms provision in
interpreting the scope of the Second Amendment. First, in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding that the Second Amendment is “fully applicable” to state conduct,91
86. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 922(q)(1)(A)–(B), 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
922 (2012)); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
901(a)(2)–(3), 82 Stat. 225 (1968) (noting that “Congress hereby finds and declares . . . that the ease with
which any person can acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun . . . is a significant factor in the
prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States [and] that only through adequate Federal
control over interstate and foreign commerce in these weapons, and over all persons engaging in the
business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in them, can this grave problem be properly dealt with,
and effective State and local regulation of this traffic be made possible . . . “).
87. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 21–22.
88. E.g., Rabbit v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 493 (Conn. 1979) (calling the governmental interest in
this context “extraordinary”); Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ind. 1958) (noting that “the
regulation of the possession of firearms is closely related to the public safety and welfare”); Redington v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 831–33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that the regulation of firearms at issue
was a valid exercise of the government’s power “to promote the health, safety, comfort, morals, and
welfare of the public” (quoting Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 959 (Ind. 1993))); Arnold v. City of
Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 172 (Ohio 1993) (stating that “[l]egislative concern for public safety is not
only a proper police power objective—it is a mandate. This court has established that firearm controls are
within the ambit of the police power.”).
89. See, e.g., Nitz, supra note 5, at 314–15.
90. See id. at 325–28.
91. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S 742, 750 (2010).
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it would violate this precedent to conclude that the Amendment only regulates state
conduct to the extent that the federal government has concurrent authority over the
area regulated. The McDonald Court expressly stated that “it would be ‘incongruous’
to apply different standards” under a federal constitutional right based solely on
whether the litigation involved state versus federal government action.92 It further
declared that “incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.”93 Thus, interpreting the
Second Amendment to mean one thing as applied to the federal government and
another as applied to the states has been foreclosed.
Second, the only originalist interpretation of history consistent with the
McDonald Court’s rationale is that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended the Second Amendment to be applied to the full breadth of state conduct.
In McDonald, the Court reasoned that the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamentally altered the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, that this alteration
contemplated application of fundamental rights provisions to the states, and that the
right to bear arms is and historically has been a fundamental right.94 Thus, it follows
from McDonald that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the Second
Amendment to regulate the full breadth of government conduct, not just the limited
powers that the federal government is authorized to exercise. Consequently,
McDonald has also foreclosed any originalist argument that the differences in state
versus federal power should be relevant with respect to how courts should interpret
the Second Amendment.
Third, this conclusion not only finds support in controlling Supreme Court
precedent, but also in logic. For example, with respect to levels of scrutiny, the fact
that state governments and the federal government have differing kinds and breadths
of power has no bearing on whether the same level of scrutiny should be applied to
both state and federal right-to-bear-arms provisions. This is because the question of
whether a regulation violates the right to bear arms does not require any assessment
of whether the government actor had the constitutional or inherent authority to enact
the regulation at issue. Instead, this analysis assesses an entirely separate issue:
whether, assuming arguendo that the government had the authority to enact the
regulation at issue, the regulation improperly infringes on the right to bear arms.95
Thus, the question of whether the government had authority ex ante to enact a
regulation is not before a court when it assesses whether that regulation violates the
right to bear arms. Consequently, there is in fact no real risk that “[i]f the federal

92. Id. at 765.
93. Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).
94. See id. at 754, 768–78.
95. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (acknowledging the
conceptual distinction between ex ante power to enact a regulation and ex post invalidity based on a
conflict with a Bill of Rights provision: “Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in many
Americans’ minds are likely to be affirmative prohibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These
affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only where the Government possesses authority to act
in the first place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be
enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in
the Constitution.”).
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government lacks the authority animating the state provision, the interpreter [might
infer] non-enumerated powers for the national government from the existence of
state law.”96 Thus, courts should not be deterred from drawing comparisons between
state right-to-bear-arms provisions and the Second Amendment based on the fact that
states enjoy police powers that the federal government does not.
2.

How the State Cases Scrutinizing Regulations Under the Right to
Bear Arms Substantively Inform the Meaning of the Second
Amendment

For those convinced that the comparison between state right-to-bear-arms
provisions and the federal Second Amendment is apt, jurists should look seriously to
state constitutional provisions on the right-to-bear-arms because this resource can
provide important substantive insights. Turning first to the textual insights that these
historical provisions provide, the language of right-to-bear-arms provisions in three
jurisdictions from these historical periods that have applied the reasonable regulation
standard is virtually identical to the language in the Second Amendment.97 Further,
the language of two additional jurisdictions whose provisions were enacted more
recently also mirror the language of the Second Amendment.98 Finally, the language
of twenty-six states, many of whom enacted provisions by the end of the nineteenth
century, is functionally equivalent to the text of the Second Amendment insofar as it
communicates an intent to protect a right to “keep” or “bear arms” for purposes of
self-defense and military use.99

96. See Nitz, supra note 5, at 315.
97. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ VIII (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed. . . . “); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30 (“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. . . . “); R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 22 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“A
well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed.”).
98. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“[T]he
right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d
357, 358 n.2 (Haw. 1996), overruling on other grounds recognized in Lowe v. Kealoha, No. 28973, 2010
Haw. App. LEXIS 866 (Dec. 22, 2010); State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
99. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“[That] every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and
the state.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of
himself or the State shall not be impaired. . . . “); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“The right of no person to
keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto
legally summoned, shall be called in question. . . . “); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Every citizen has a right
to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a) (“The right of the people to
keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be
infringed. . . . “); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right
shall not be abridged. . . . “); IND. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the
defense of themselves and the State.”); KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4 (“A person has the right to keep
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state. . . . “); KY. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1, para.
7 (“All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which
may be reckoned: . . . The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State. . . . “); ME. CONST.
art. I, § 16 (“Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be questioned.”);
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and
the state.”); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12 (“The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of
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The concern that may arise because of textual differences between the
Second Amendment and state provisions is that the Second Amendment’s text
protects a broader right, and therefore courts should apply a higher level of scrutiny
to laws that infringe this right. Yet, even states with very broadly written provisions
have applied the reasonable regulation standard.100 Indeed, two states have very
recently recognized that since “rational regulation” is the governing standard, the
relevant constitutional language must be specifically amended for courts to apply
“strict scrutiny” to the right to bear arms.101 Thus, this argument is meritless. While
Kopel and Cramer argue that “the Second Amendment text differs from most of the
state texts,”102 and suggest that this might serve as a reason to interpret the Second
Amendment differently from state provisions, Kopel and Cramer only cite to one
state, Tennessee, to support this assertion.103 That citation hardly supports the
sweeping suggestion that the text materially differs from “most” states. They then
derive from this one jurisdiction the conclusion that multiple “state constitutional
guarantees articulate only a ‘common defence’ purpose for the right to arms,. . . .
[while] [u]nder Heller, . . . the right of personal self-defense lies at the core of the
his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be
called in question. . . . “); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The right of any person to keep or bear arms in
defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally
summoned, shall not be called in question. . . . “); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a (“All persons have the right
to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their families, their property and the state.”); OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security. . . . “); OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 26 (“The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or
in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited. . . . “); OR. CONST.
art. I, § 27 (“The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the State. . . .
“); PA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State
shall not be questioned.”); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed.”); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (“The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of
themselves and the state shall not be denied.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“That the citizens of this State
have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense. . . . “); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every
citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State. . . . “); VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. 16 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
State. . . . “); VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. . . . “); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“The right of the individual
citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired. . . . “); WYO. CONST. art. I,
§ 24 (“The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied.”).
100. See, e.g., Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 179 (Ky. 2006) (applying the reasonable
regulation test to Kentucky’s right to bear arms provision); Holland v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 83,
85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (calling Kentucky’s provision one of the “broadest expression[ism] of the right to
bear arms”); see also, e.g., ME. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and
this right shall never be questioned.” (emphasis added)); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All persons are by
nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are . . . the
right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful
common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be
denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof.”); State v. Mowell, 672 N.W.2d 389, 401 (Neb.
2003) (applying the reasonable regulation standard to Nebraska’s right to bear arms provision).
101. See State v. Eberhardt, 2014-0209, p. 5 (La. 7/1/14); 145 So. 3d 377, 381; State v. Merritt, 467
S.W.3d 808, 810 (Mo. 2015).
102. Kopel & Cramer, supra note 64, at 1115.
103. See id. at 1115 n.9 (referring the reader to the “text accompanying notes 91–96,” which only
discusses one case, Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840)).
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[right].”104 Not only do they fail to identify support for this generalization, there is
no support for this proposition. Of the forty-three states with an individual right to
bear arms, thirty-six states have explicitly acknowledged in the text of their right-tobear-arms provision or in case law that self defense is one of the concerns underlying
this right.105 And the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged as much in McDonald v.
City of Chicago.106 Moreover, the authors could find no state case law among the
states that have recognized an individual right-to-bear-arms that had rejected self
defense as a legitimate concern underlying this right.
Furthermore, Kopel and Cramer’s suggestion that technical differences in
the language of the Second Amendment might merit different treatment ignores the
functional equivalence of the language of most states with right-to-bear-arms
provisions, as noted above.107 Most states use synonyms that capture the same
concepts as those identified in the Second Amendment, for example states may use
the terms “abridged” or “impaired” instead of “infringed.” Consequently, Kopel and
Cramer’s observation should have little persuasive force with respect to whether
courts should consider state case law on the right to bear arms. Thus, application of
a different standard cannot be justified on the basis that the Second Amendment uses
unique language or targets a different kind of right dissimilar to the rights protected
in these state provisions.
Turning now to the historical value of these state provisions, there is a very
strong, pervasive, and long-held tradition of applying this reasonable regulation
104. Id. at 1115.
105. See twenty-five of the right to bear arms provisions quoted in supra note 99 (except Tennessee)
that explicitly include self-defense language such as “right to bear arms in defense of himself” or “in
defense of his . . . person.” These states include Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. Eight additional states applying the reasonable regulation standard have recognized that a
concern for self defense animates, among other concerns, their state right-to-bear-arms provisions in either
the textual provision or case law. See NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11(1) (“Every citizen has the right to keep and
bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful
purposes.”); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are . . . to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person,
family, property, and the state. . . . “); Kalodimos v. Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ill. 1984)
(acknowledging that Illinois’s right-to-bear-arms provision was intended to protect the ability to engage
in self-defense); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Neb. 1989) (quoting Article I, Section 1 of
Nebraska’s Constitution, which includes among the protected interests a right to “keep and bear arms for
security or defense of self, family, home, and others . . . “); State ex rel. N.M. Voices for Children, Inc. v.
Denko, 2004-NMSC-011, ¶ 5, 90 P.3d 458 (quoting Article II, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution,
which provides for a right, inter alia, to “keep and bear arms for security and defense . . . “); Univ. of
Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, ¶ 19, 144 P.3d 1109 (quoting Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution,
which provides a right to bear arms for “security and defense of self, family others, property, or the
state . . . “); State ex rel. W. Va. Div. of Natural Res. v. Cline, 488 S.E.2d 376, 379 n.3 (W. Va. 1997)
(quoting Article III, Section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution, which provides for a right, inter alia,
“to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state . . . “); State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI
113, ¶ 66, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (holding that the state right-to-bear-arms provision included
a right to do so “to protect one’s person, family, or property against unlawful injury . . . “ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). These states include Delaware, Illinois, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
106. 561 U.S. 742, 777 (2010).
107. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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standard, because twenty-six states have explicitly adopted this approach, and six
more have implicitly done so, and this trend stretches back to the early nineteenth
century.108 For example, in State v. Reid the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a statute
that prohibited the “evil practice of carrying weapons secretly.”109 The Alabama
Court determined the validity of the legislation by measuring the scope of the
legislation against the nature of the evil addressed.110 The Court then noted that the
statutory limitation on bearing arms was of a type given “the Legislature the authority
to adopt such regulations of police, as may be dictated by the safety of the people
and the advancement of public morals.”111
Similarly, the 1840 Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that the
legislature had the right to protect the public safety by adopting reasonable
regulations on how and when such arms might be carried.112 Subsequently, in the
1870s, the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed gun control legislation against an
attack under the language of the Texas constitution by explaining that gun control
regulation has a long history in our nation.113 A decade later, the Missouri Supreme
Court followed the same course in State v. Shelby.114 In Shelby, the defendant was
indicted for carrying a deadly weapon while intoxicated. The Missouri Supreme
Court, relying on United States v. Cruickshank,115 first held that the Second
Amendment did not apply.116 The Court then observed that it was accepted by 1886
that the legislature could prohibit the carrying of deadly weapons into a school room
or polling place and the court then upheld the carrying-while-intoxicated legislation
against constitutional attack as a reasonable regulation designed to protect the safety
of citizens.117 Finally, in the 1890s, in State v. Workman, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld as reasonable, against a Second Amendment challenge, a
statutory limitation on carrying dangerous or deadly weapons of the kind “usually
employed in brawls, street-fights, duels, and affrays.”118
Thus, well before the adoption of the Civil War Amendments, state courts
were consistently upholding reasonable limitations on constitutional guarantees of
the right “to bear arms.”119 This common sense form of viewing the right-to-bear-

108. See Winkler, supra note 16, at 600 (identifying a case from 1886 that applied the reasonable
regulation standard); cf. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 314 (1825) (“[T]he right to keep
firearms . . . does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.”).
109. 1 Ala. 612, 614 (1840).
110. Id. at 615.
111. Id. at 616.
112. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159 (1840); see also Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251
(1846) (holding that the legislature may prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons but not totally prohibit
“bearing arms”).
113. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478–79 (1872).
114. 2 S.W. 468 (Mo. 1886).
115. 92 U.S 542 (1876).
116. Shelby, 2 S.W. at 469.
117. Id. Note, however, that this precedent has not been revisited by the Missouri Supreme Court since
the recent adoption of strict scrutiny, and thus it remains unclear under its new standard whether this
precedent remains good law.
118. 14 S.E. 9, 11–12 (W. Va. 1891).
119. Indeed, even by the time of the American Revolution, there was an established tradition of local
regulation of both the classes of people and the types of arms that could possessed. See Lawrence
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arms in light of the legislature’s duty to protect the health and safety of the citizenry
was repeatedly applied to limitations on the definition of “arms,”120 the manner of
carrying protected weapons,121 and where protected arms could be carried.122
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, state courts generally continued
to review legislative limitations on the possession and use of firearms in light of the
purpose of the constitutional guarantee and whether the legislature had rationally
exercised governmental power in limiting the constitutional right.123
We acknowledge that while significant case law applying the reasonable
relationship standard existed in the nineteenth century, most of the precedent setting
this level of scrutiny occurred during the twentieth century. Because levels of
scrutiny were not developed until the twentieth century, under Carolene Products,124
we argue that for originalists, the relatively younger age of the precedent should not
be the controlling question, but rather whether the state in question had a right-toRosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control,
92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1187 (2015).
120. See, e.g., Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 459–61 (1876) (holding that the right to bear arms refers to
arms used for purposes of war, and that the legislature may prohibit wearing of such weapons as are not
used in civilized warfare and would not contribute to the common defense); Commonwealth v. Murphy,
44 N.E. 138, 138–39 (Mass. 1896) (deciding whether a disabled rifle is an “arm”); Aymette v. State, 21
Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158–59 (1840) (“The Legislature, therefore, have a right to prohibit the wearing or
keeping weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in civilized
warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence. . . . [Citizens] need not, for [the purpose of the
common defense], the use of those weapons which are usually employed in private broils, and which are
efficient only in the hands of the robber and the assassin. These weapons would be useless in war. They
could not be employed advantageously in the common defence of the citizens. The right to keep and bear
them is not, therefore, secured by the constitution.”); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458–59 (1874); English
v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1872); see also Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 260, 260 (Okla. 1908) (interpreting
the word “arms” to “appl[y] solely to such arms as are recognized in civilized warfare, to wit, guns,
swords, bayonets, horsemen’s pistols, etc., and not [to] those used by a ruffian, brawler, or assassin, such
as pocket pistols, dirks, sword canes, bowie knives, etc.”).
121. See, e.g., Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387, 388–89 (1858); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616 (1840); State
v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27–29 (1842); Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227–28 (1861); State v. Mitchell, 3
Blackf. 229, 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 399–400 (1858) (interpreting the
constitutionality of a statute’s proscribed mode of carry under the Second Amendment); Aymette, 21 Tenn.
(2 Hum.) at 161–62 (in upholding a conviction under a concealed carry law, the court stated that “a
prohibition to wear a spear concealed in a cane would in no degree circumscribe the right to bear arms in
the defence of the State; for this weapon could in no degree contribute to its defence, and would be worse
than useless in an army. . . . We think . . . the Legislature had the right to pass the law under which the
plaintiff in error was convicted.”).
122. See, e.g., State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 529–31 (1881) (upholding a statute against a Second
Amendment challenge that prohibited carrying a concealed weapon into any school room or place where
people are assembled for educational, literary, or social purposes); cf. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.)
418, 418, 422–23 (1843) (upholding a conviction of a person appearing in a public place armed with an
unusual or dangerous weapon and uttering a threat).
123. See, e.g., State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 58–63 (1872); Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 298,
300–301 (1878).
124. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also John Galotto, Strict
Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 513–15 (1993) (acknowledging Carolene
Products as the seminal case giving rise to levels of scrutiny analysis); Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of
the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 356–57, 360 & n.38
(2006) (identifying Carolene Products as the case giving rise to the birth of strict scrutiny, and then
arguing that this was first applied in the First Amendment context).
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bear-arms provision (as opposed to case law setting the level of scrutiny) by the end
of the nineteenth century, close to when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted and
thus when the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states. Twenty states
that apply the reasonable regulation standard meet this criterion,125 thereby creating
a powerful database of jurisdictions with historically relevant provisions that have
adopted this level of scrutiny.
Due respect for this long-held, well-established state jurisprudence would
counsel in favor of applying the same level of scrutiny to the Second Amendment.
The precedent at issue here has been in place for well over a century.126 The U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly and recently acknowledged that where a pervasive,
long-held, undisturbed tradition has existed, our courts should not lightly disturb that
tradition.127 Additionally, the Second Amendment context is unique as far as federal
constitutional interpretation is concerned because entire bodies of state case law on
the right to bear arms have developed over the past two centuries in the absence of a
similarly well-developed body of federal case law.128 Thus, in this unique context,
“the uniformity in the [decision to apply the reasonable regulation standard] lends
particular authority to [this] decision[].”129 Finally, the authors have not identified a

125. See infra Appendix, Table II (Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming). Also, notably some state provisions that came after the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment were patterned on early provisions: Oregon’s right to bear arms was
patterned on the Indiana constitution’s enumeration, which was patterned on the Ohio and Kentucky
provisions, which were patterned on the Pennsylvania provision. State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1116,
1118 (Or. 2005).
126. See Winkler, supra note 16, at 600 (identifying a case from 1886 that applied the reasonable
regulation standard).
127. See, e.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–48 (2011) (“[A] universal
and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates a strong presumption that the
prohibition is constitutional: Principles of liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within
constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation’s consciousness.” (quoting Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002))); Wong v. Smith, 131 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting to a denial of certiorari) (reasoning that the long, undisturbed common law tradition of
permitting judges to comment on the evidence in a trial counsels that “federal courts should tread lightly”
before finding this tradition to violate federal law); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A test for implementing the protections
of the Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding traditions
cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.”).
128. See Winkler, supra note 16; see also Kopel & Cramer, supra note 64, at 1114 (acknowledging
that “federal courts have relatively little experience in Second Amendment cases” and that “nearly two
centuries of state court cases interpreting state right to arms guarantees provide useful guidance”).
129. Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Conn. 1995) (also noting that other jurisdictions
“overwhelmingly have recognized that the right is not infringed by reasonable regulation by the state in
the exercise of its police power to protect the health, safety and morals of the citizenry”); see also
Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 330 n.10 (Colo. 1994) (noting that the court could not identify
“even one published opinion where the strict scrutiny standard of review has been applied to a firearms
regulation”); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 927 A.2d 1216, 1222 (N.H. 2007) (noting that “state
courts universally reject strict scrutiny or any heightened level of review in favor of a standard that
requires weapons laws to be only ‘reasonable regulations’ on the [right to bear arms]” (quoting Winkler,
supra note 16, at 599)); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 172 (Ohio 1993) (observing “[t]hat
the right to bear arms is not an unlimited right and is subject to reasonable regulation is an accepted
principle among other jurisdictions” and that “[t]he majority of the cases which have decided this issue
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significant pattern of state constitutional amendments proposed or passed in an effort
to upset this tradition. Consequently, this precedent constitutes a pervasive and longheld tradition that is entitled to deference. If courts were to apply any level of scrutiny
higher than the reasonable regulation standard to the Second Amendment, this higher
level of scrutiny will control the analysis, thereby eviscerating the well-established
state case law on this issue. Thus, courts should “tread lightly” before applying any
higher level of scrutiny than the reasonable regulation standard.130
Furthermore, federal and state courts alike, including the U.S. Supreme
Court in its prior case law on the Second Amendment, have long applied this
reasonable regulation standard, or a similar reasonable relationship test, to the
Federal Second Amendment.131 For example, the Texas Supreme Court in English v.
State rejected a Second Amendment constitutional challenge to a state law
prohibiting carrying common dangerous weapons.132 The Texas Court looked at the
original intent of the Second Amendment and concluded that concealed personal
arms were not within the ambit of its protection.133
It is true that many nineteenth century state court opinions were premised
on the concept that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states and therefore
they either ignored the Second Amendment entirely or merely concluded, with little
analysis, that its intent was consistent with the relevant state provision.134 However,
the vast majority of the state courts have expressly affirmed the power of the state to
pass reasonable regulations consistent with the Second Amendment, following

has taken the position that legislation which regulates or prohibits the possession or use of certain arms
must be reasonable to be a valid exercise of the police power”); Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044
(R.I. 2004) (commenting that “[n]umerous jurisdictions have recognized that the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms under a state constitution is not absolute and that reasonable regulatory control by the
Legislature to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens uniformly has been upheld”); Second
Amendment Found. v. Renton, 668 P.2d 596, 598 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (“It should be noted that while
36 states have constitutional provisions concerning the right to bear arms, in none is the right deemed
absolute.”); City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 146 (W. Va. 1988) (“[C]ourts have uniformly
upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over
the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.”); State
v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 12, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.
130. Wong, 131 S. Ct. at 12 (Alito, J., dissenting to a denial of certiorari).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1938) (reasoning that “[i]n the absence of
any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument”); State v. Rupp, 282
N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979) (interpreting the Federal Second Amendment as a right subject to
reasonable regulation); Hardison v. State, 437 P.2d 868, 871 (Nev. 1968) (applying the reasonable
regulation standard to the Second Amendment); State v. Angelo, 130 A. 458, 459 (N.J. 1925) (per curiam)
(recognizing that the federal right to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulations).
132. See English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476–77 (1872).
133. Id. at 476.
134. See, e.g., State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468, 469 (Mo. 1886); State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250
(1844); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 171–75 (1871); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 457–58
(1874); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (recognizing that “[f]or most of
our history, the Bill of Rights was not thought applicable to the States, and the Federal Government did
not significantly regulate the possession of firearms by law-abiding citizens”).
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adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.135 Thus, this trend suggests that there is even
long-standing precedential support for the proposition that the reasonable regulation
standard applies to the Second Amendment.
While some U.S. courts of appeals since District of Columbia v. Heller have
applied different levels of scrutiny than the reasonable regulation standard,
intermediate and strict scrutiny, these decisions have not taken into account the long
history in our nation of applying the reasonable regulation standard, including by the
Supreme Court itself.136 Because these decisions have not considered this crucial,
informative resource, they should not carry the day.
A third kind of insight that this trend can provide, for jurists concerned with
contemporary American values, is how strongly contemporary Americans generally
believe this right should be enforced. The fact that jurisdictions so overwhelmingly
apply the same level of scrutiny, and the fact that there has not been a pattern of state
initiatives to amend these state rights to increase the level of scrutiny, indicates that
most jurists and Americans view this level of scrutiny as the appropriate lens through
which to analyze this right. The greater the number and percentage of states that
adopt a certain interpretation of the right, the stronger the inference that this is how
contemporary Americans understand this right. Because nearly every state to have
addressed this issue squarely has adopted the reasonable regulation standard, this
trend provides powerful evidence that Americans agree that this is the proper
standard to regulate the right to bear arms.
We argue that state court decisions such as the ones reviewed in this Article
better reflect modern American values than other kinds of evidence of undisturbed
traditions of the people because judicial decision-makers have repeated opportunities
to consciously reconsider historic positions through court decisions.137 In contrast,
often traditions continue unaltered precisely because no person or entity has
responsibility for deciding their continued merit.
We also argue that state court decisions better reflect contemporary values
than federal judicial decisions for two reasons. First, state judges are unique in that
they face elections, rather than lifetime appointment, in approximately four-fifths of
135. See discussion supra Part II; cf. United States v. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337, 346
(Mich. Terr. 1829) (dicta recognizing that the Constitution grants a right “to keep and bear arms. But the
grant of this privilege cannot be construed into the right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor.”).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate
scrutiny); United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 414–17 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to the right at issue and intimating that it might apply strict scrutiny to laws that infringe more heavily on
the “core” of the Second Amendment right); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011)
(applying strict scrutiny to the challenged ordinance); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–802
(10th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the challenged ordinance); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the law challenged
under the Second Amendment). But see Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.
2015) (applying a variation of the reasonable regulation standard); United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d
160, 164–66 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to a law that did not impose a
substantial burden on the ability of citizens to possess and use firearms lawfully for self-defense); United
States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to a law
that it held to fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment).
137. Notably, the Heller majority appeared to implicitly recognize this point by affirming the validity
of the “longstanding prohibitions” established by state courts with regard to the evolving definition of
“arms.” See 554 U.S. at 626–27.

270

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46; No. 2

the states.138 Thus, many state judges are directly accountable to the people in their
decision-making. Second, it is relatively easy in state government for the people to
amend state constitutions, as compared with the process for amending the federal
Constitution. In nearly half of the states, the people may propose constitutional
amendments by ballot initiative.139 Thus, state supreme court decisions not
overturned by voter initiatives more likely evidence popular support for, or
acquiescence in, those decisions. Thus, this method may help provide an objective
measure of contemporary American values for modernist scholars concerned with
interpreting the Constitution in light of modern values. In states where there is a line
of evolving precedent, other judges will gain the benefit of the changing perspective
and be able to evaluate it against the original interpretation.
Further, significant undisturbed state court decisions evidence modern
values even in states lacking initiative mechanisms, since voters may amend their
state constitutions far more easily than they can amend the federal Constitution.140
Amending the federal Constitution obviously requires approval by two-thirds of both
houses and ratification by three-fourths of the states.141 In contrast, amending state
constitutions usually calls for only a simple majority of those voting for
ratification.142 Other common structures require approval of two-thirds, three-fifths,
or three-fourths of the legislature and then ratification by a majority of the voters.143
In some states, voters may amend the constitution even more easily as they only need
the legislature to pass an amendment by simple majority and then a majority of voters
to approve it.144 Unsurprisingly, the average number of state constitutional
amendments far exceeds the number of amendments to the federal Constitution.145
Thus, the permanence of a constitutional provision after a state court’s
construction evidences ratification by the people. In this case, the fact that most states
have adopted the reasonable regulation standard, and this level of scrutiny has only
been apparently amended by the people through constitutional amendment in two
138. See infra Appendix, Table III.
139. See infra Appendix, Table III.
140. In fact, in the two states with the greatest number of constitutional amendments as of 2006, South
Carolina and Texas, with respectively 485 and 432 amendments each, the state constitutions do not
provide for ballot initiatives. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED States, at
xxxvii (2d ed. 2006).
141. U.S. CONST. art. V.
142. See infra Appendix, Tables III & IV. States utilizing this structure or a similar procedure include
Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
143. See infra Appendix, Tables III & IV. The precise fraction of legislative support required varies
by states. States employing this structure or a similar procedure include Alabama, Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, West
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
144. See infra Appendix, Tables III & IV. States using this system include Arizona, Arkansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
145. The American people have amended the Federal Constitution just 27 times. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVII. In contrast, states have amended their state constitutions an average of 139 times, as of
2006. See MADDEX, supra note 140, at xxxiii–vii (individual numbers provided by source were averaged).
South Carolina alone has passed 485 amendments, the greatest number to date. See MADDEX, supra note
140, at xxxvii.
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states,146 evidences ratification of this level of scrutiny by the people. This
observation is especially powerful because in several states, the state legislature or
the people have amended their right-to-bear-arms provision numerous times.147
Consequently, if Americans believed that their right to bear arms deserved more
robust protection, history indicates that they would have taken action through their
voting power.
Finally, for non-originalist judges, courts construing the federal
Constitution’s Bill of Rights may find state constitutional decisions particularly
useful because state constitutional decisions may inform courts about the various
approaches that modern courts and society have adopted with respect to a particular
provision and the strength of the rationales utilized by other jurisdictions.148 As
Justice Breyer has explained, comparative analysis may inform courts facing federal
constitutional issues about how to address those problems in the best possible way.149
For discussion of the reason-borrowing value of state court decisions on the right to
bear arms, see the discussion supra regarding state rationales for applying the
reasonable regulation standard instead of strict scrutiny, despite identifying this right
as fundamental.150
Turning to the laboratory value of looking comparatively to state
jurisdictions, a West Virginia case from 1891 exemplifies how courts can employ
comparative constitutional interpretation to inform the potential consequences of a
particular interpretation. In State v. Workman, the West Virginia Supreme Court of

146. See State v. Eberhardt, 2014-0209, p. 5 (La. 7/1/14); 145 So. 3d 377, 381 (amending the right to
bear arms provision to require courts to apply strict scrutiny); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Mo.
2015) (same); see also State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ¶¶ 5–9, 100 P.3d 1218 (noting that before 1984, the
state right to bear arms provision explicitly provided that “the Legislature may regulate the exercise of
this right by law,” but that the 1984 amendment changed the text to delete this provision and instead state
the Legislature was not prevented “from defining the lawful use of arms”).
147. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art I, § 19 (enacted 1956 and amended 1994); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20
(adopted 1987); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (amended 1968 and 1990); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended
1978); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22 (proposed and adopted 1970); KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4 (enacted
1859 and amended 2010); LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 1974); ME. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended
1987); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6 (amended 1963); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1945); NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 1 (amended 1988 to include a right to bear arms); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11(1) (adopted 1982);
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a (adopted 1982); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6 (amended 1971 and 1986); N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 30 (amended 1971); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (adopted 1984); UTAH. CONST. art. I, § 6
(amended 1984); VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (amended1971); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22 (adopted 1986);
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted 1998); see also Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and
Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 208–17 (2006); Louisiana Considers ‘Right to Keep and Bear
Arms’ Amendment, OPPOSING VIEWS, http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/guns/louisiana-rightkeep-and-bear-arms-amendment-now-eligible-consideration-state-house (describing a 2012 amendment
to Louisiana’s right to bear arms provision that would require courts to review gun control legislation
under the “strict scrutiny” standard); see also infra Appendix, Table II (showing that in most states in
existence by 1900, their right-to-bear-arms provision had undergone several amendments by 1868 or by
the end of the 19th century).
148. See Larsen, supra note 2, at 1289–1290, 1291–92, 1295.
149. Foreign Materials Debate, supra note 7, at 522–23; see also Larsen, supra note 2, at 1299–1300
(noting that much of constitutional law depends upon predictions about the likely effect of a rule, which
justifies reference to the decisions and experience of other jurisdictions to measure the accuracy of a
prediction).
150. See supra Part III.A.1.
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Appeals surveyed the experience of other states in upholding a statutory limitation
on carrying certain “dangerous or deadly weapon[s].”151 The court compared the
West Virginia experience with that of Kentucky,152 where such weapons were not
regulated after Bliss. Demonstrating the laboratory effect advocated by the authors
herein, the West Virginia Court concluded that the result of Kentucky’s
constitutional interpretation prohibiting any legislation limiting the right to bear arms
was “a prolific harvest of murders, street-fight, and family feuds . . . to the
degradation and terror of society, and the abasement of justice and civil order.”153
Modern courts may in a similar fashion look to the consequences of varying
interpretations of the right to bear arms and the real-life consequences while
assessing the propriety of a particular law under the right to bear arms.
In sum, because of the myriad powerful reasons to take state constitutional
precedent seriously with respect to the issue of what level of scrutiny applies to the
Second Amendment, we conclude that courts should follow the lead of the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to have considered the issue and apply the
reasonable regulation test. For the implications of adopting this standard, we refer
the reader to prior scholarship that has already explored this issue.154
B.

The Lessons of State Constitutional Provisions and Jurisprudence for
Interpreting the Scope of the Terms “Keep and Bear”

Many jurisdictions have discussed the breadth and limitations on the ability
of state governments to regulate where and in what manner individuals may “bear”
arms. From an empirical perspective, out of the forty-three states with provisions
protecting the right to bear arms, twenty of these states have expressly held either
through the language of their state’s right-to-bear-arms provision, or through case
law, that the legislature may ban entirely the carrying of concealed weapons, and two
additional states have implicitly held as much.155 Further, since the 1822 Kentucky
151. 14 S.E. 9, 11–12 (W. Va. 1891).
152. See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
153. Workman, 14 S.E. at 11.
154. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 16, at 598–613; Winkler, supra note 78., at 688, 715–27 (discussing
in depth “what Second Amendment doctrine might look like under [the reasonable regulation] test”).
155. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home,
person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in
question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed
weapons.”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right
shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of
weapons concealed on the person. . . . “); KY. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1, para. 7 (“All men are, by nature,
free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned . . . [t]he
right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly
to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended
2012) (“The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not
prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person.”); MISS. CONST.
art. III, § 12 (“The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property,
or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but the
Legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The right
of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but nothing herein contained shall
be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“No law shall abridge
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decision in Bliss v. Commonwealth, the authors have found no state decisions
declaring such legislation to be constitutionally banned.156
1.

Why the Comparison between the Second Amendment and State
Right-to-Bear-Arms Provisions is Apt with respect to the Scope of the
Terms “Keep and Bear”

There are several reasons why courts should find this trend persuasive in
interpreting the Second Amendment. First, many state right-to-bear-arms provisions
that have been read to permit concealed carry bans share key characteristics with the
Second Amendment that make the comparison valid: that the right has been
considered fundamental, that it has been read as animated in part by concerns for self
defense, and that similar governmental concerns underlie regulations under both
state and federal right-to-bear-arms provisions. Turning to the first shared feature,
like Heller, several of the states that have upheld concealed carry bans also recognize
their state constitution’s right to bear arms to be a fundamental right.157 In concluding
that this does not prevent regulation of the right, these courts have emphasized that
the right to bear arms “is not absolute and may be subject to restriction and

the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational
use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed
weapons.”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30 (“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies in time
of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be kept under strict
subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying
concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice.”);
State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–22 (1840) (upholding a ban on carrying concealed weapons under the state
constitution); State v. Moerman, 895 P.2d 1018, 1020–21, 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Haile v.
State, 38 Ark. 564, 566–67 (1882) (same); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 18–19, 28 (1842) (upholding a
ban on concealed weapons under the Second Amendment); Carlton v. State, 58 So. 486, 488 (Fl. 1912)
(upholding a ban on carrying concealed weapons under the state constitution); Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga.
225, 226–28 (1861) (same); State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72, 73 (Idaho 1945) (same); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf.
229, 229 (Ind. 1833) (same); State v. Doile, 648 P.2d 262, 263–65 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Klein v. Leis,
99 Ohio St. 3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶¶ 3–19 (same); State v. Wann, No. 19866-5-II,
1996 Wash. App. LEXIS 817, at *4–6 (Dec. 30, 1996) (acknowledging that state law requires a permit to
carry a concealed weapon and holding that this law did not violate the right to bear arms); City of Seattle
v. Parker, 467 P.2d 858, 859, 862 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (enforcing a statute that made it a crime to carry
a concealed weapon without a license); State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 10–12 (W. Va. 1891) (upholding a
conviction for violation of a ban on carrying concealed weapons); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 1–2,
49–50, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; King v. Wyo. Div. of Criminal Investigation, 2004 WY 52, ¶¶
27–28, 89 P.3d 341, 352 (providing that there is no constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon);
State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1236, 1237 (Wyo. 1986) (upholding a statute banning the carrying of
concealed deadly weapons); see also Bay Cty. Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd. v. Gasta, 293 N.W.2d
707, 708 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (implicitly approving of regulations regarding concealed weapons by
recognizing the authority of the Concealed Weapons Licensing Board based on the reasoning that the
existence of this board “reflects the state’s legitimate interest in limiting public access to weapons suitable
for criminal purposes and confirms the notion that the constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms is
subject to a reasonable exercise of the police power”); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 927 A.2d
1216, 1218, 1223 (N.H. 2007) (upholding under the state constitution the decision of a police department
to revoke an individual’s permit to carry a concealed weapon).
156. See Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) at 91–93.
157. See, e.g., Bleiler, 927 A.2d at 1221; Klein, 2003-Ohio-4779, ¶ 7; Arnold v. City of Cleveland,
616 N.E.2d 163, 171 (Ohio 1993); Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 10–11.
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regulation.”158 Because other states have considered this feature carefully and
concluded that it does not prevent legislatures from passing concealed carry bans,
federal courts should consider this precedent carefully.
Turning to the second shared feature, many states upholding concealed
carry bans have read their provisions to be animated by a concern for self defense,159
just as the U.S. Supreme Court similarly recognized that the Second Amendment
was animated by this concern.160 In determining that this concern did not prevent
legislatures from enacting concealed carry bans, courts have reasoned, for example,
that it is not necessary to self defense that weapons be carried secretly, and in fact
one is able to access his weapon more readily when it is not concealed.161 Courts
have similarly reasoned that these provisions were “intended to give the people the
means of protecting themselves against oppression and public outrage, and . . . not
designed as a shield for the individual man who is prone to load . . . his pockets with
revolvers or dynamite, and make of himself a dangerous nuisance to society.”162
Because of the material similarities between the Second Amendment and provisions
that have addressed the concealed carry issue, courts should take notice of these cases
in assessing whether concealed carry bans comport with the Second Amendment.
Finally, the governmental concerns animating decisions to uphold
concealed carry bans apply with equal force under the Second Amendment.163 We
discussed in Part III.A.1, supra, some of the compelling governmental concerns that
animate gun control regulations generally, and those observations apply with equal
force to concealed carry bans. As an illustration of some of the potential dangers of
laws permitting concealed carrying of weapons, the lone shooter who executed the
mass shooting involving Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was legally carrying a
concealed weapon on that tragic day.164 If his weapon had been exposed, as courts
often reason, those in the parking lot may have been put on notice that he was armed
more quickly and thus might have been better able to protect themselves and the
victims of the shooting. At least twenty-nine other mass shootings in the United
States since May 2007 involving concealed weapons have also been identified.165

158. Bleiler, 927 A.2d at 1222 (quoting State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279, 281 (N.H. 1990)); see also, e.g.,
People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 390–91 (Colo. 1975); Trinen v. City of Denver, 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo.
App. 2002); People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 676 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d
481, 483 (N.D. 1987); Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 172; Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 871–72 (Wyo. 1982).
159. See supra note 105.
160. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (noting that “the inherent right to
self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right”).
161. State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 621 (1840).
162. Carlton v. State, 58 So. 486, 488 (Fl. 1912); see also Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566 (1882).
163. See supra Part III.A.1.
164. See Violence Policy Center, Tucson Attack Most Recent Mass Shooting Involving Legal
Concealed
Weapons
Holder,
YUBANET.COM,
(Feb.
11,
2011,
10:11
AM),
http://yubanet.com/usa/Tucson-Attack-Most-Recent-Mass-Shooting-Involving-Legal-ConcealedWeapons-Holder.php#.UA8SGqBCY1R.
165. Concealed Carry Killers, VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, http://concealedcarrykillers.org/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016) (documenting, inter alia, all of the mass shootings committed by concealed carry
killers).
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Courts have considered these and other compelling concerns in upholding concealed
carry bans.166
Therefore, because state constitutional right-to-bear-arms provisions are
materially similar to the Second Amendment with respect to the issue of how
governments may regulate the manner of bearing arms, courts should look to this
precedent when faced with challenges to concealed carry bans.
2.

How the State Cases Interpreting the Scope of the Terms “Keep and
Bear” Substantively Inform the Meaning of the Second Amendment

The case law upholding concealed carry bans can provide numerous
insights. First, jurists concerned with modern values should find the precedent
upholding concealed carry bans persuasive because the strength of the trend, with
twenty-three states permitting such bans and no states categorically prohibiting
them.167 This strong trend indicates that contemporary Americans do not consider
the ability to carry concealed weapons central to the right to bear arms. This trend
should consequently provide significant guidance to jurists who find modern values
persuasive in assessing the meaning of a constitutional right. As further evidence that
modern Americans support these bans, the authors have not identified any pattern of
constitutional amendments or initiatives by state citizens aimed at overturning the
case law upholding these bans. Thus, this trend deserves serious consideration.
Additionally, for originalist jurists primarily concerned with the meaning of
the text of the Second Amendment, there is no textual basis in the Second
Amendment to arrive at a different conclusion from the one adopted by these state
courts.168 The operative words in assessing whether concealed carry bans violate the
right to bear arms are what is the scope of the term “bear arms” in the phrase “the
right . . . to . . . bear arms.”169 Every single one of the jurisdictions that have upheld
concealed carry laws uses the same “bear arms” language in the Second
Amendment.170 And every single one of those jurisdictions that had a right-to-beararms provision by the end of the nineteenth century had the “bear arms” language in

166. See infra Part III.B.2.
167. For an example of a case considering the intent of modern citizens with respect to the scope of
the right to bear arms, see State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328. The court
acknowledged that “indications of the will of the people are valuable” and looked to public opinion polls
at the time the right to bear arms provision was enacted, which showed that “almost eighty percent of
Wisconsinites opposed legalizing carrying of concealed weapons.” Id.
168. Cf. Digiacinto v. Rector of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 369 (Va. 2011) (stating that
provisions of the Virginia constitution that are substantively similar to those in the United States
Constitution should be afforded the same meaning).
169. U.S. CONST. amend II.
170. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5; COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 13; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. VIII; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; IND.
CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1, para. 7; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 11; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a.; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25; WYO. CONST.
art. I, § 24.
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their constitutional provisions at that time as well.171 Thus, these jurisdictions share
a similar textual basis in analyzing whether concealed carry bans pass constitutional
muster.
Third, this case law upholding the government’s ability to ban concealed
weapons also has historical value for originalists. As the Supreme Court in the Heller
majority opinion acknowledged, “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider
the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under
the Second Amendment or state analogues.”172 Indeed, several jurisdictions
established that state governments could ban the carrying of concealed weapons as
early as the mid-nineteenth century, before or close to the time that the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted.173 For example, the 1833 Indiana Supreme Court held a
state prohibition on carrying concealed weapons constitutional.174
Similarly, in 1840 the Tennessee Supreme Court was presented the question
of whether a statute which prohibited the wearing of a concealed Bowie knife
violated the state right to bear arms.175 The Tennessee Court first interpreted the
terms “to bear arms” to “have reference to their military use, and were not employed
to mean wearing them about the person as a part of the dress.”176 Using what might
now be called “Scalia originalism,” the Tennessee Supreme Court then recognized
that the common understanding that the right “to bear arms” was for the “common
defense, such that “[protected] arms . . . are such as are usually employed in civilized
warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military equipment. . . . “177 The Court on
this basis upheld the ban on carrying these concealed weapons.178 This pattern
suggests a strong, well-established tradition of regulating concealed weapons.
Further, because this pattern occurred before the adoption of the Fourteenth
171. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 5; COLO. CONST. of 1876,
art. II, § 13; FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights § 20; FLA. CONST. of 1868, Declaration of Rights
§ 22; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 1, para. XXII; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 11; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25; LA.
CONST. of 1879, Bill of Rights art. III; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12;
MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 17; MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 8;
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 13; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 24; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 24; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.
172. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
173. See, e.g., KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25 (“That the rights of the citizens to bear arms in
defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned; but the general assembly may pass laws to
prevent persons from carrying concealed arms.”); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–22 (1840); Haile v. State,
38 Ark. 564, 566–67 (1882); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842); Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 226–
28 (1861); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229, 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Jumel, 3 La. Ann. 399, 399–400
(1858). A few more jurisdictions arrived at this same conclusion by the early twentieth century. See
Carlton v. State, 58 So. 486, 488 (Fla. 1912); State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 663–64 (Ohio 1920).
174. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. at 229.
175. State v. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 155–56 (cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 613–14). Notably,
this right has obvious self-contained limitations (i.e. “free white men”) which historical evolution of
constitutional interpretation has since found unreasonable.
176. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158.
177. Id. This is, of course is consistent with the Supreme Court interpretation in United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174 (1939), as well as with the Heller majority’s recognition that limitations historically support
“prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.”‘ 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting 4 Blackstone
148–49 (1769)).
178. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 159, 161–62.
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Amendment, this provides some evidence that the framers were aware of these state
regulations and did not mean to disturb them in incorporating the Second
Amendment against the states.
Also, many of the more modern cases have relied on historical rationales in
arriving at their conclusions. Some courts have looked to history for evidence of a
tradition of concealed carry bans. For example, in State v. Moerman, the Arizona
Court of Appeals relied, in part, on the fact that concealed carry bans were in place
around the time that the state provision was enacted.179 Other courts have looked to
history for evidence of the intended scope of their state’s right-to-bear-arms
provision.180 It then concluded that the state provision was “not intended to afford
citizens the means of prosecuting, more successfully, their private broils in a free
government.”181 Thus, these state decisions provide helpful insights into how early
Americans understood the right to bear arms, and these insights indicate that
concealed carry bans comport with the right to bear arms.
Fourth, these rulings reflect thoughtful decision-making, and thus are
valuable repositories for reason borrowing. The relative importance of protecting this
right in various places and settings is a factor that has undergirded the decision of
some courts to uphold concealed carry bans.182 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
explained in upholding a concealed carry ban in the context of a weapon carried in a
motor vehicle: “there are two places in which a citizen’s . . . right to keep and bear
arms for purposes of security is at its apex: in the . . . home or in his or her privatelyowned business. . . . [T]he individual’s . . . right to bear arms . . . will not . . . be
particularly strong outside those two locations.”183
Another concern that has driven several decisions to uphold concealed carry
regulations is the governmental interest at issue. Courts have reasoned that the
governmental concerns underlying concealed carry bans are compelling. As the
Arizona Court of Appeals reasoned, concealed carry bans “protect[] the public by
preventing an individual from having on hand a deadly weapon of which the public

179. 895 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); accord King v. Wyo. Div. of Criminal Investigation,
2004 WY 52, ¶ 27, 89 P.3d 341, 351 (Wyo. 2004) (same); see also Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St. 3d 537,
2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶ 12 (in upholding a concealed carry ban, relying in part on the fact
that had “been part of our legal heritage since 1859” and had not been fundamentally modified since then);
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 8, 37, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (observing that “[t]he Wisconsin
Legislature first passed a concealed weapons law in 1872” and noting that the legislators at the time of
the framing contemplated that gun control legislation would survive the passage of the right to bear arms).
180. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 615 (1840); Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566 (1882).
181. Haile, 38 Ark. at 566.
182. E.g., id. (“The Legislature, by the law in question, has sought to steer between [its interest in
promoting peace in society] and an infringement of constitutional rights, by conceding the right to keep
such arms, and to bear or use them at will, upon one’s own premises, and restricting the right to wear them
elsewhere in public, unless they be carried uncovered in the hand.”); see also State v. Doile, 648 P.2d 262,
263–65 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
183. State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶ 27, 90 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495. For other cases recognizing
that the right to bear arms is at its apex in the home and at one’s personal business, see Matthews v. State,
148 N.E.2d 334, 338 (Ind. 1958), In re Colby H., 766 A.2d 639, 646–50 (Md. 2001), People v. Buckmire,
638 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 (1995), Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169–70 (Ohio 1993), and Gilio v.
State, 2001 OK CIV APP 122, ¶ 21, 33 P.3d 937, 941.
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is unaware, and which an individual may use in a sudden heat of passion.”184 In a
similar vein, some courts have focused on the consequences if concealed carry bans
were not permitted.185
Finally, from an empirical perspective, at least twenty-nine mass shootings
in the United States involving concealed weapons have been identified.186 This trend
indicates that absolutely protecting the right to carry concealed weapons in public
can create alarming security risks for the American people. Courts have considered
these and other compelling concerns in upholding concealed carry bans.187 Based on
all of the valuable insights that state court decisions on laws banning the carrying of
concealed weapons may provide, a careful examination of this trend indicates that
concealed carry bans should be deemed to fall well within the scope of permissible
regulations under the Second Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Though the methodology debate is decades old, there is still merit in
searching for valuable resources that may enhance ability of jurists to better interpret
the Federal Constitution. One type of underutilized resource in analyzing the Federal
Constitution is state constitutional law. State constitutional decisions provide the
legal laboratory for cautious courts to consult for guidance. Simultaneously, these
materials should satisfy concerns of comparative constitutional law skeptics that our
democratic Constitution should reflect the choices and values of our nation’s people.
This resource can particularly benefit analysis of the Federal Constitution’s Second
Amendment because there is such a well-established body of state case law on the
right to bear arms, and there are many questions that remain unanswered, questions
that implicate the rights, safety, and security of our nation’s people.
Further, the Second Amendment context clearly demonstrates the value of
considering historical state court analysis of both the federal and state

184. State v. Moerman, 895 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d
1021, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)); see also Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t., 927 A.2d 1216, 1218,
1223 (N.H. 2007) (acknowledging “the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards
involved with guns” in upholding a municipality’s decision to revoke an individual’s permit to carry
concealed weapons); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 43, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (relying, in
part, on the “danger of widespread presence of weapons in public places” if the legislature could not ban
the carrying of concealed weapons (citation omitted)).
185. See, e.g., Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566 (1882); see also Bleiler, 927 A.2d at 1223 (reasoning
that regulation of carrying concealed weapons is justified by “the danger of [the] widespread presence of
[concealed] weapons in public places and police protection against attack in these places” (quoting Cole,
2003 WI 112, ¶ 43)); Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 43 (quoting a 1953 Kentucky case for the preposition that
under English common law the practice of carrying concealed weapons was banned because “persons
becoming suddenly angered and having such a weapon in their pocket, would be likely to use it, which in
their sober moments they would not have done, and which could not have been done had the weapon been
upon their person” (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 807, 807–808 (Ky. 1953)).
186. More than 800 Deaths at the Hands of Concealed Carry Killers Since 2007, VPC Research
Shows, VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/press/more-than-800-deaths-at-the-hands-ofconcealed-carry-killers-since-2007-vpc-research-shows/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (documenting, inter
alia, all of the mass shootings committed by concealed carry killers).
187. See infra Part III.B.2.
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constitutions.188 As illustrated above, interpreting state constitutional right-to-beararms provisions, like the Second Amendment, may involve textual analysis,
historical analysis, and reference to precedent and policy concerns. State
jurisprudence on the right to bear arms may contribute to our evolving federal Second
Amendment jurisprudence by providing an objective measure of how greatly
Americans value this right and the values that most states have sought to primarily
forward through the constitutional right to bear arms. They also can inform the
consequences of various interpretations. Because of these valuable insights, these
resources should prove useful to jurists charged with the task of interpreting the
Federal Constitution’s Second Amendment.
As a final note, the benefits of consulting state constitutions can extend to
areas of constitutional jurisprudence well beyond the Second Amendment context.
These resources offer potential utility in informing textual and historical
interpretations of both many of the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights provisions.
The inclusion or exclusion of particular rights in state constitutions also can serve as
evidence of how greatly contemporary Americans value the right at issue. Further
state constitutional interpretations can also inform the likely consequences of a
particular construction with respect to any provision that the federal and state
constitutions share. Therefore, courts should study state constitutional doctrine for
any area of constitutional law in which the parties debate the meaning of the text, the
purposes of a provision, the values of the people, and the potential consequences of
an interpretation.

188. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585, 600–603, 611–14 (2008); id. at 648–
49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

APPENDIX: SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
TABLE I: COMPARISON ON FOUNDING ERA STATE CONSTITUTIONS

States in Existence
by 1787

States in
Existence by 1803

When Right to Bear
Arms Provision Was
Enacted & Citation

Connecticut

NONE EXISTED

Delaware

NONE EXISTED

Georgia

NONE EXISTED
Kentucky

1792
Ky. Const. of 1792,
Art. XII, cl. 23.

Maryland

NONE EXISTED

Massachusetts

1780
Mass. Const. Pt. 1,
Art. 17.

New Hampshire

NONE EXISTED

New Jersey

NONE EXISTED

New York

NONE EXISTED

North Carolina

1776
N.C. Declaration of
Rights § XVII.
Ohio

1802
Ohio Const. of 1802,
Art. VIII, § 20.

Pennsylvania

1790
Pa. Declaration of
Rights, cl. XIII.

Rhode Island

NONE EXISTED

South Carolina

NONE EXISTED
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States in Existence
by 1787

States in
Existence by 1803

Tennessee

1796
Tenn. Const. of 1796,
Art. XI, § 26.

Vermont

1777
Vt. Const. Ch. I, Art.
16.

Virginia
Total # of States
with a Constitution
by 1787: 13

When Right to Bear
Arms Provision Was
Enacted & Citation

NONE EXISTED
Total # of States
with a Constitution
by 1803: 17

Total # of States with
a Right to Bear Arms
Provision by 1787: 2
out of 13.
Total # of States with
a Right to Bear Arms
Provision by 1803: 7
out of 17.
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TABLE II: ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS–COMPARISON OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
EXISTING IN 1868 (DURING THE PASSAGE OF THE 14TH
AMENDMENT) AND BY 1900

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

Alabama

–Ala. Const. of
1819, Art. I, §
23 (“Every
citizen has a
right to bear
arms in defence
of himself and
the state.”)
–Ala. Const. of
1861, Art. I, §
23 (same
language as in
1819)
–Ala. Const. of
1865, Art. I., §
27 (same
language, but
added “That”
before “every”)
–Ala. Const. of
1868, Art. I, §
28 (same
language as in
1865)

“That every citizen
has a right to bear
arms in defence of
himself and the
state.” Ala. Const.
of 1868, Art. I, §
28.

Arkansas
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1861, 1864,
& 1868)

–Ark. Const. of
1861, Art. II. §
21 (“That the
free white men
and Indians of
have the right
to keep and
bear arms for

“The citizens of this
state shall have the
right to keep and
bear arms, for their
common defense.”
Ark. Const. of
1868, Art. II, § 5.3

States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900

3. Id. at 278.
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Arkansas,
cont.

their individual
or common
defence.”1
–Ark. Const. of
1864, Art. II, §
21 (“That the
free white men
of this state
shall have a
right to keep
and bear arms
for their
common
defence.”2
–Ark. Const. of
1868

California

NONE
EXISTED
Colorado

–Colo. Const.
of 1876, Art. II,
§ 13

283

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

“That the right of
no person to keep
and bear arms in
defense of his
home, person and
property, or in aid
of the civil power
when thereto
legallysummoned,
shall be called into
question; but
nothing herein
contained shall be
construed to justify
the practice of
carrying concealed
weapons.”

1. URIAH M. ROSE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS 215 (1891).
2. Id. at 247.
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
Connecticut

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)
–Conn. Const.
of 1818, Art. I,
§ 15

Vol. 46; No. 2

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right
“Every citizen has a
right to bear arms in
defence of himself
and the state.”

Delaware
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776, 1792,
1831, and
1897)

NONE
EXISTED4

Florida
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1838, 1861,
1865, 1868, &
1885)

–Fla. Const. of
1838, Art. I, §
21 (“That the
free white men
of this State
shall have the
right to keep
and to bear
arms, for their
common
defense.”)
–Fla. Const. of
1861, Art. I, §
21 (same)
–Fla. Const. of
1865 (provision
excluded)
–Fla. Const. of
1868, Art I., §
22 (reinstated
with egalitarian
language)

“The people shall
have the right to
bear arms in
defence of
themselves and of
the lawful authority
of the State.” Fl.
Const. of 1868,
D.O.R., § 22.
“The right of the
people to bear arms
in defense of
themselves and the
lawful authority of
the State, shall not
be infringed, but the
Legislature may
prescribe the
manner in which
they may be borne.”
Fla. Const. of 1885,
D.O.R. § 20.

NONE
EXISTED
UNTIL 1861

“A well-regulated
militia being
necessary to the

Georgia
(Relevant
constitutions

4. RANDY JAMES HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 1-19
(2002).
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
in 1777, 1789,
1798, 1861,
1865, 1868, &
1877)
Georgia, cont.

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

–Ga. Const. of
1861, Art. I, § 6
(“The right of
the people to
keep and bear
arms shall not
be infringed.”)

security of a free
people, the right of
the people to keep
and bear arms shall
not be infringed;
but the general
assembly shall have
power to prescribe
by law the manner
in which arms may
be borne.” Ga.
Const. of 1868, Art.
I, § 14.
Ga. Const. of 1877,
Art. I, § 1, Para.
XXII (same except
excludes the
prefatory clause)

–Ga. Const. of
1865, Art. I, § 4
(“A well
regulated
militia, being
necessary to the
security of a
free State, the
right of the
people to keep
and bear arms
shall not be
infringed.”)
Idaho

285

–Idaho Const.
of 1890, Art. I,
§ 11.

“The people have
the right to keep
and bear arms,
which right shall
not be abridged; but
this provision shall
not prevent the
passage of laws to
govern the carrying
of weapons
concealed on the
person nor prevent
passage of
legislation
providing minimum
sentences for
crimes committed
while in possession
of a firearm, nor
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Idaho, cont.

NONE
EXISTED

Indiana
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1816, 1851)

–Ind. Const. of
1816, Art. I, §
20 (“That the
people have a
right to bear
arms for the
defence of
themselves. . .”
–Ind. Const. of
1851, Art. I,
§ 32.

Kansas

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right
prevent the passage
of legislation
providing penalties
for the possession
of firearms by a
convicted felon, nor
prevent the passage
of any legislation
punishing the use of
a firearm. . . . “

Illinois
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1818, 1848,
& 1870)

Iowa

Vol. 46; No. 2

“The people shall
have a right to bear
arms, for the
defense of
themselves and the
State.” Ind. Const.
of 1851, Art. I,
§ 32.

NONE
EXISTED
–Kan. Const. of
1859, Bill of
Rights, § 4.

“The people have
the right to bear
arms for their
defense and
security. . .”
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Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

Kentucky
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1792, 1799,
& 1850)

–Ky. Const. of
1792, Art. XII,
§ 23 (“The
rights of the
citizens to bear
arms in defense
of themselves
and the State
shall not be
questioned.”)
–Ky. Const. of
1799, Art. X, §
23 (same).
–Ky. Const. of
1850, Art. XIII,
§ 25.

“That the rights of
the citizens to bear
arms in defence of
themselves and the
State shall not be
questioned; but the
general assembly
may pass laws to
prevent persons
from carrying
concealed arms.”

Louisiana
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1812, 1845,
1852, 1864,
1868, 1879, &
1898)

NONE
EXISTED until
1879
–La. Const. of
1879, B.O.R.,
Art. III.
–La. Const. of
1898, B.O.R.
Art. 8. (same
language as in
1879)

“A well regulated
militia being
necessary to the
security of a free
State, the right of
the people to keep
and bear arms shall
not be abridged.
This shall not
prevent the passage
of laws to punish
those who carry
weapons
concealed.” La.
Const. of 1879,
B.O.R., Art. III

Maine

–Me. Const. of
1819, Art. I, §
16.

“Every citizen has a
right to keep and
bear arms for the
common defence;
and this right shall
never be
questioned.”

States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)
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Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

Maryland
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776, 1851,
1864, & 1867)

NONE
EXISTED

Massachusetts

–Mass. Const.
of 1780, Pt. 1,
Art. 17.

“The people have a
right to keep and to
bear arms for the
common defence.
And as, in time of
peace, armies are
dangerous to
liberty, they ought
not to be
maintained without
the consent of the
legislature. . . . “

Michigan

–Mich. Const.
of 1850, art.
XVIII, § 7.

“Every person has a
right to bear arms
for the defence of
himself and the
state.”

Minnesota

NONE
EXISTED

Mississippi
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1817, 1832,
1868, & 1890)

–Miss. Const.
of 1817, Art. I,
§ 23 (“Every
citizen has a
right to bear
arms in defence
of himself and
of the State.”)
–Miss. Const.
of 1832, Art. I,
§ 23 (same
language)

“All persons shall
have a right to keep
and bear arms for
their defence.”
Miss. Const. of
1868, Art. I, § 15.
“The right of every
citizen to keep and
bear arms in
defense of his
home, person or
property, or in aid
of the civil power
when thereto
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)
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Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

Mississippi,
cont.

–Miss. Const.
of 1868, Art. I,
§ 15.
–Miss. Const.
of 1890, Art.
III, § 12.

legally summoned,
shall not be called
in question, but the
legislature may
regulate or forbid
carrying concealed
weapons.” Miss.
Const. of 1890, Art.
III, § 12.

Missouri
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1820, 1865,
& 1875)

–Mo. Const. of
1820, Art. VIII,
§ 3 (“that [the
people’s] right
to bear arms, in
defense of
themselves and
of the state,
cannot be
questioned.”)
–Mo. Const. of
1865, Art. I, §
8.
–Mo. Const. of
1875, Art. II, §
17

“[T]hat [the
people’s] right to
bear arms in
defence of
themselves and of
the lawful authority
of the State cannot
be questioned.” Mo.
Const. of 1865, Art.
I, § 8.
“That the right of
no citizen to keep
and bear arms in
defense of his
home, person or
property, or in aid
of the civil power,
when thereto
legally summoned,
shall be called into
question; but
nothing herein
contained is
intended to justify
the practice of
wearing concealed
weapons.” Mo.
Const. of 1875, Art.
II, § 17.
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
Montana

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)
–Mont. Const.
of 1889, Art.
III, § 13.

Nebraska
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1866, 1871,
& 1875)

NONE
EXISTED

Nevada

NONE
EXISTED

New
Hampshire
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776 &
1784)

NONE
EXISTED

New Jersey
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776, &
1844)

NONE
EXISTED

Vol. 46; No. 2

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right
“The right of any
person to keep or
bear arms in
defense of his own
home, person, or
property, or in aid
of the civil power
when thereto
legally summoned,
shall not be called
into question, but
nothing herein
contained shall be
held to permit the
carrying of
concealed
weapons.”
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States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
New York
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1777, 1821,
1846, & 1894)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

NONE
EXISTED

North
Carolina
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776 &
1868)

–N.C. Const. of
1776, D.O.R.
XVII (“That the
people have a
right to bear
arms, for the
defence of the
State . . . “)
–N.C. Const. of
1868, Art. I, §
24.
North Dakota

Ohio
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1802 &
1851)

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)
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“A well-regulated
militia being
necessary to the
security of a free
State, the right of
the people to keep
and bear arms shall
not be infringed. . . .
“ N.C. Const. of
1868, Art. I, § 24.

NONE
EXISTED
–Ohio Const. of
1851, Art. I, §
4.

“The people have
the right to bear
arms for their
defense and
security. . . . “

Oregon

–Or. Const. of
1857, Art. I, §
27.

“The people shall
have the right to
bear arms for the
defence of
themselves, and the
State. . . . “

Pennsylvania
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776, 1790,
1838, & 1874)

–Pa. Const. of
1776, Ch. 1,
XIII (“That the
people have a
right bear arms
for the defence
of themselves

“The right of the
citizens to bear
arms, in defence of
themselves and the
State, shall not be
questioned.” Pa.
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Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

Pennsylvania,
cont.

and the
state. . .”)
– Pa. Const. of
1790, Art. IX, §
XXI (“That the
right of the
citizens to bear
arms, in
defence of
themselves and
the state, shall
not be
questioned.”)
–Pa. Const. of
1838, Art. 1, §
XXI (same as
1790)

Const. of 1838, Art.
I, § XXI
Pa. Const. of 1874,
Art. I, § 21
(substantially the
same as 1838).

Rhode Island

–R.I. Const. of
1842, Aart. I, §
22.

“The right of the
people to keep and
bear arms shall not
be infringed.”

South
Carolina
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776, 1778,
1790, 1861,
1865, 1868, &
1895)

NONE
EXISTED
UNTIL 1868.
–S.C. Const. of
1868, Art. I, §
28.
–S.C. Const. of
1895, Art. I, §
26.

“The people have a
right to keep and
bear arms for the
common
defence. . . . “ S.C.
Const. of 1868, Art.
I, § 28.
“A well regulated
militia being
necessary to the
security of a free
State, the right of
the people to keep
and bear arms shall
not be infringed.”
S.C. Const. of 1895,
Art. I, § 26.

States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
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Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

–S.D. Const. of
1889, Art. VI, §
24

“The right of the
citizens to bear
arms in defense of
themselves and the
state shall not be
denied.”

Tennessee
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1796, 1835,
& 1870)

–Tenn. Const.
of 1796,
D.O.R., § 26
(“That the free
men of this
State have a
right to keep
and to bear
arms for their
common
defence.”)
–Tenn. Const.
of 1835, Art. I,
§ XXVI (same
language).
–Tenn. Const.
of 1870, Art I,
§ 26

“That the free white
men of this State
have a right to keep
and to bear arms for
their common
defence.” Tenn.
Const. of 1835, Art.
I, § 26.
“… But the
Legislature shall
have power by law
to regulate the
wearing of arms
with a view to
prevent crime.”
Tenn. Const. of
1870, Art I, § 26

Texas
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1827, 1836,
1845, 1866,
1869, & 1876)

NONE
EXISTED
UNTIL 1845.
“Every citizen
shall have the
right to keep
and bear arms,
in the lawful
defence of
himself or the
State.” Tex.
Const. of 1845,
Art. I, § 13.
–Tex. Const. of
1866, Art. I, §

“Every person shall
have the right to
keep and bear arms,
in the lawful
defence of himself
or the State, under
such regulations as
the Legislature may
prescribe.” Tex.
Const. of 1869, Art.
I, § 23.
“Every citizen shall
have the right to
keep and bear arms
in the lawful

States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
South Dakota
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Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right

13 (same as
1845).
–Tex. Const. of
1836, D.O.R.,
14th (same as
1845 except
uses “Republic”
instead of
“State”)

defence of himself
or the State; but the
Legislature shall
have power by law
to regulate the
wearing of arms
with a view to
prevent crime.”
Tex. Const. of
1876, Art I, § 23

Utah Const. of
1895, Art. I, §
6.

“The people have
the right to bear
arms for their
security and
defense, but the
Legislature may
regulate the
exercise of this
right by law.”

Vermont
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1777, 1786,
& 1793)

–Vt. Const. of
1777, Ch. I,
Art. XV.
–Vt. Const. of
1786, Ch. I,
Art. XVIII
(same language
as in 1777).
–Vt. Const. of
1793, Ch. I,
Art. 16th (same
language as in
1777).

“That the people
have a right to bear
arms for the
defence of
themselves and the
State. . . . “ Vt.
Const. of 1793, Ch.
I, Art. 16th.

Virginia
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1776, 1830,
1851, 1864, &
1870)

NONE
EXISTED
UNTIL 1870.
–Va. Const. of
1870, Art. I, §
13.

“That a well
regulated militia,
composed of the
body of the people,
trained to arms, is
the proper, natural,

States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900
Texas, cont.

Utah

2016

SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

States in
States in
Existence with Existence with
Constitution Constitution by
by 1868
1900

Right to Bear
Arms
Provision
(Year Enacted
& Citation)

Virginia, cont.

Language of the
Gun Ownership
Provision &
Nature of the
Right
and safe defense of
a free state,
therefore, the right
of the people to
keep and bear arms
shall not be
infringed. . . . “

Washington

–Wash. Const.
of 1889, Art. I,
§ 24

West Virginia
(Relevant
constitutions
in 1863 &
1872)

NONE
EXISTED

Wisconsin

NONE
EXISTED
Wyoming

Totals:
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–Wyo. Const.
of 1889, Art. I,
§ 24.

States with a
Provision by
1868: 22 of 37
States with a
Provision by
1900: 31 of 45

“The right of the
individual citizen to
bear arms in
defense of himself,
or the state, shall
not be impaired. . . .
“

“The right of
citizens to bear
arms in defense of
themselves and of
the State shall not
be denied.”
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TABLE III: MODERNIST ANALYSIS–COMPARISON OF CURRENT
CONSTITUTIONS

State

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Alabama

Ala.
Const.
Art. I,
§ 26

MOST
RIGOROUS
Art. XVIII,
§ 284

NO

Alaska

Alaska
Const.
Art. I,
§ 19

MOST
YES
RIGOROUS Art. 11,
Art. 13, § 1 §§ 1-3, 6

Arizona

Ariz.
Const.
Art. II,
§ 26

Arkansas

Ark.
Const.
Art. II,
§ 5.

California

NO

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

YES
Reasonable
Art. VI,
regulation
§ 152
standard. Hyde v.
Birmingham, 392
So. 2d 1226, 1227
(Ala. Crim. App.
1980)

YES
Intermediate
Art. IV, scrutiny. Gibson
§ 5, 6.
v. State, 930 P.2d
1300, 1302
(Alaska App.
1997).
LEAST
YES
YES
Reasonable
RIGOROUS Art. 4, Part Art. VI, §
regulation
Art. 21, § 1
1, § 2
12
standard. City of
Tucson v. Rineer,
971 P.2d 207,
212, 213 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Dano v.
Collins, 802 P.2d
1021, 1023 (Ariz.
App. 1990)).
LEAST
YES
YES
Implicit
RIGOROUS Art. 5, § 1 Art. 7,
reasonable
Art. 19, § 22
§ 29
regulation
standard. Jones v.
State, 862 S.W.2d
273, 275 (Ark.
1993).
MOST
YES
YES
RIGOROUS Art. II, § 8 Art. 6,
Art. XVIII,
§ 16
§§ 1, 4

2016

SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State

Colorado

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision
Colo.
Const.
Art. II,
§ 13.

MOST
RIGOROUS
Art. XIX,
§2

YES
Art. V,
§1

YES
Art VI,
§ 20

297

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

Reasonable
regulation
standard.
Robertson v. City
& County of
Denver, 874 P.2d
325 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Blue,
544 P.2d 385
(Colo. 1975).
Connecticut
Conn.
INTERNO
NO
Reasonable
Const.
MEDIATE
Art. 5, § 2
regulation
Art. I,
Art. XII
standard.
§ 15.
Benjamin v.
Bailey, 662 A.2d
1226, 1232
(Conn. 1995).
Delaware
Del.
MOST
NO
NO
Intermediate
Const. RIGOROUS
Art. 4, § 3 Scrutiny. Doe v.
Art. I,
Art. 16, § 1,
Wilmington
Housing
§ 20.
but requires
2/3 voter
Authority, 88
ratification
A.3d 654, 666-67
(Del. 2014).
Florida
Fl. Const.
MOST
YES
YES
Reasonable
Art. I,
RIGOROUS Art. XI, § 3 Art. V,
regulation
§ 8.
Art. XI, §§
§ 10
standard. Rinzler
1, 5, but
v. Carson, 262
requires
So. 2d 661, 665
60% voter
(Fl. 1972).
ratification
Georgia
Ga.
MOST
NO
YES
Reasonable
Const. RIGOROUS
Art. VI,
regulation
Art. I, § I, Art. X, § 1,
§7
standard. Carson
¶ VIII.
Para. II
v. State, 247
S.E.2d 68 (Ga.
1978).
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State

Hawai’i

Idaho

Illinois

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision
Haw.
Const.
Art. I,
§ 17.

INTERMEDIATE
Art. XVII,
§3

NO

Vol. 46; No. 2

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

NO
Reasonable
Art. VI, §
regulation
3
standard. State v.
Mendoza, 920
P.2d 357
(Haw. 1996).
Idaho
MOST
YES
YES
Implicit
Const. RIGOROUS Art. III, § 1 Art. V,
reasonable
Art. I,
Art. XX, § 1
§6
regulation
§ 11.
standard. State v.
Hart, 157 P.2d
72, 73 (Idaho
1945)
(acknowledging
that the
legislature has the
right to regulate
the exercise of the
right to bear arms
and upholding a
concealed carry
law because such
provisions
“generally [have
been] held to be a
reasonable
exercise of the
police power”).
Ill. Const.
MOST
YES
YES
Unclear.
Art. I,
RIGOROUS Art. XIV, Art. IV, Compare City of
§ 22.
Art. XIV,
§3
§§ 10, 12
Chicago v.
§1
Taylor, 774
N.E.2d 22 (Ill.
App. 2002)
(applying rational
basis review),
with People v.
Montyce H., 2011
Ill. App. LEXIS
1184 (Nov. 18,

2016

SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Illinois, cont.
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Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

2011) (applying
intermediate
scrutiny).
YES
Reasonable
Art. 7, §§
regulation
10, 11
standard.
Matthews v.
State, 148 N.E.2d
334, 338 (Ind.
1958).

Indiana

Ind.
Const.
Art. I,
§ 32.

INTERMEDIATE
Art. 16, § 1

NO

Iowa

NO.

INTERMEDIATE
Art. X, § 1

NO

YES
Art. 5,
§ 17

Reasonable
regulation
standard. State v.
Rupp, 282
N.W.2d 125, 130
(Iowa 1979)
(interpreting the
Federal Second
Amendment as a
right subject to
reasonable
regulation).

Kansas

Kan.
Const.
B.O.R.
§ 4.

MOST
RIGOROUS
Art. 14, § 1

NO

YES
Art. 3, § 5

Implicit
reasonable
regulation
standard.
Junction City v.
Mevis, 601 P.2d
1145, 1151-52
(Kan. 1979).

Kentucky

Ky.
Const.
B.O.R.
§ 1, ¶ 7.

MOST
RIGOROUS
Part II, § 256

NO

YES
Part I,
§ 117

Reasonable
regulation
standard. Posey
v.Commonwealth,
185 S.W.3d 170,
179
(Ky. 2006).
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State

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Vol. 46; No. 2

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

Louisiana

La.
Const.
Art. I,
§ 11

MOST
RIGOROUS
Art. XIII,
§1

NO

YES
Art. V,
§ 22

Strict scrutiny
standard. State v.
Eberhardt, 145
So.3d 377, 381
(La. 2014).

Maine

Me.
Const.
Art. I,
§ 16.

MOST
RIGOROUS
Art. X, § 4

NO

NO
Art. VI,
§4

Reasonable
regulation
standard. State v.
Brown, 571 A.2d
816, 817-19
(Me. 1990).

Maryland

Md. D.O.R.
MOST
Art. 28. RIGOROUS
Art. XIV,
§1

NO

YES
Art.
IV,
Part I,
§ 35

Does not create an
individual right.
Scherr v. Handgun
Permit Review Bd.,
880 A.2d 1137
(Md. App. 2005).

Mass.

Mass. Const. INTERPt. 1, Art. MEDIATE
XVII.
Art. IV,
§§ 4, 5

YES
Art.
LXXXI,
§§ 1-2

NO
Art. III,
§1

Does not create an
individual right.
Chief of Police v.
Moyer, 453 N.E.2d
461
(Mass. App. 1983).

Michigan Mich. Const. MOST
Art. I, § 6. RIGOROUS
Art. XII, § 1

YES
Art. II,
§9

YES
Reasonable
Art. VI, regulation standard.
§2
People v. Brown,
235 N.W. 245
(Mich. 1931); see
also People v Swint,
572 N.W.2d 666,
675 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997).

5. Maryland
State
Archives,
Constitution
of
Maryland,
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/43const/html/ const.html (last visited May 17, 2009).

2016

SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State

Minnesota

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision
NO

LEAST
RIGOROUS
Art. IX, § 1

NO

Mississippi Miss. Const. MOST
YES
Art. III, RIGOROUS Art. XV,
§ 12.
Art. XV, § 2
§3

301

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

YES
Reasonable
Art. VI, regulation standard.
§7
In re Application of
Atkinson, 291
N.W.2d 396, 399
(Minn. 1980)
(finding that even if
the state constitution
protects a nonenumerated right to
bear arms, that right
is subject to
reasonable
regulations).
YES
Reasonable
Art. VI, regulation standard.
§ 153 James v. State, 731
So. 2d 1135, 1137
(Miss. 1999).

Missouri

Mo. Const.
LEAST
YES
Art. I, § 23 RIGOROUS Art. III,
Art. XII, § 2 §§ 49-50

YES
Strict scrutiny
Art. V,
standard. State v.
§ 25 Merritt, 467 S.W.3d
808, 810
(Mo. 2015).

Montana

Mont.
MOST
YES
Const. Art. RIGOROUS
Art.
II § 12.
Art. XIV, XIV, § 9
§8

YES
Unclear. James v.
Art. VII, Musselshell County,
§8
No. DV-95-74, 1998
Mont. Dist. LEXIS
737, at *3
(“Although citizens
of this country may
have some right to
bear arms, exercise
of this right is not
without
limitation. . . . “).

302

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

State

Nebraska

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Vol. 46; No. 2

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

Neb. Const.
MOST
YES
Art. I, §1 RIGOROUS Art. III,
“All persons Art. XVI,
§2
§1
are by
nature free
and
independent,
and have
certain
inherent and
inalienable
rights; . . . “

YES
Reasonable
Art. V, regulation standard.
§ 21
State v. Comeau,
448 N.W.2d 595,
598-99 (Neb. 1989).

Nev. Const. INTERArt. 1,
MEDIATE
§ 11(1).
Art. XVI,
§1

YES
Art.
XIX, § 1

YES Unclear. Pohlabel v.
Art. VI,
State, 268 P.3d
§ 22 1264, 1269-72 (Nev.
2012) (upholding a
ban on possession of
firearms by felons
without announcing
a level of scrutiny).

New
N.H. Const.
MOST
Hampshire
Pt. I,
RIGOROUS
Art. 2-a. Part II, Art.
100, but
requires 2/3
voter
ratification
New Jersey
NO
MOST
RIGOROUS
Art. 9, § 1

NO

New Mexico N.M. Const. LEAST
Art. II, § 6. RIGOROUS
Art. XIX,
§1

NO

NO
Reasonable
Part I, regulation standard.
Art. 35
Bleiler v. Chief,
Dover Police Dep’t,
927 A.2d 1216,
1219-23
(N.H. 2007).
NO
Reasonable
Art. VI, regulation standard.
§6
State v. Angelo, 130
A. 458, 459
(N.J. 1925).
YES
Reasonable
Art. VI,
relationship
§ 33
standard. State v.
Rivera, 853 P.2d
126, 129
(N.M. Ct. App.
1993).

.

Nevada

NO

2016

SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State

New York

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision
NO

INTERMEDIATE
Art. XIX,
§1

NO

North
Carolina

N.C. Const.
MOST
Art. I, § 30. RIGOROUS
Art. XIII,
§4

NO

North
Dakota

N.D. Const. LEAST
YES
Art. I,
RIGOROUS Art. III,
§1.
Art. IV, § 16
§1

303

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

YES
Art. VI, §
6, except
Court of
appeals
YES
Reasonable
Art. IV, regulation standard.
§ 16
State v. Dawson,
159 S.E.2d 1, 9, 10
(N.C. 1968); Britt v.
State, 681 S.E.2d
320, 322-23 (N.C.
2009) (finding
reasonable
regulation test
violated); see also
State v. Whitaker,
201 N.C. App. 190,
689 S.E.2d 395
(2009) (rejecting
application of strict
scrutiny to this
right).
YES
Reasonable
Art. VI, regulation standard.
§7
State v. Ricehill, 415
N.W.2d 481, 483
(N.D. 1987).
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State

Ohio

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Vol. 46; No. 2

Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

Ohio Const.
MOST
Art. I, § 4. RIGOROUS
Art. XVI,
§1

YES
Art. II,
§1

YES
Reasonable
Art. IV, regulation standard.
§6
Arnold v. City of
Cleveland, 616
N.E.2d 163, 172
(Ohio 1993); Klein
v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d
633, 636-38 (Ohio
2003) (applying the
standard even
though the right is
fundamental); see
also State v. Nieto,
130 N.E. 663
(Ohio 1920).

Oklahoma Okla. Const. LEAST
Art. II, § 26. RIGOROUS
Art. XXIV,
§1

YES
Art. V,
§2

YES
Reasonable
Art. VII, regulation standard.
§3
State ex rel. Okla.
State Bureau of
Investigation v.
Warren, 975 P.2d
900, 902-03
(Okla. 1998).

Or. Const.
LEAST
YES
Art. I, § 27 RIGOROUS Art. IV,
Art. XXVII,
§1
§1

YES
Implicit reasonable
Art. VII, regulation standard.
§1
State v. Hirsch, 114
P.3d 1104, 1117-18,
1135 (Or. 2005); see
also State v. Smoot,
775 P.2d 344, 345
(Or. App. 1989)
(upholding a
regulation reasoning
that the law was
“reasonably related
to public safety”).

Oregon

2016

SUMMARY TABLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Pennsylvania Pa. Const.
INTERArt. I, § 21. MEDIATE
Art. XI, § 1

NO

Rhode Island R.I. Const.
LEAST
Art. I, § 22. RIGOROUS
Art. XIV,
§1

NO

South
Carolina

S.C. Const.,
MOST
NO
Art. I, § 20. RIGOROUS
Art. XVI, §
1; elected
legislature
must also
ratify
South
S.D. Const. LEAST
YES
Dakota
Art. VI, § RIGOROUS Art. III,
24.
Art. XXIII,
§1
§§ 1, 3
Tennessee Tenn. Const. INTERNO
Art. I, § 26. MEDIATE
Art. XI, § 3,
but the
second
voting
legislature
must
approve by
2/3
Texas
Tex. Const.
MOST
NO
Art. I, § 23. RIGOROUS
Art. XVII,
§1
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Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

YES
Implicit reasonable
Art. V, regulation standard.
§ 13 Minich v. County of
Jefferson, 919 A.2d
356, 361 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2007).
NO
Reasonable
Art. X, regulation standard.
§§ 4,5
Mosby v. Devine,
851 A.2d 1031,
1044
(R.I. 2004).
YES
Unclear. State v.
Art. V, Bolin, 662 S.E.2d
§3
38, 39 n.2
(S.C. 2008).

YES
Art. V,
§7

Unclear. (No
relevant case law
found)

YES
Implicit reasonable
Art. VI, regulation standard.
§3
State v. Callicutt, 69
Tenn. 714, 716
(1878) (upholding
gun control laws
because the laws
were passed with a
view “to prevent
crime”).
YES
Reasonable
Art. V, regulation standard.
§2
Wilson v. State, 44
S.W.3d 602, 605
(Tex. App. 2001).
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State

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision
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Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

Utah

Utah Const.
MOST
Art. I, § 6. RIGOROUS
Art. XXIII,
§1

NO

YES
Unclear. State v.
Art. VIII, Willis, 100 P.3d
§2
1218, 1222 (Utah
2004) (upholding a
ban on possession of
firearms by felons
without announcing
a level of scrutiny);
State v. Vlacil, 645
P.2d 677, 683 (Utah
1982) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“It is
conceded by all that
the State has the
power under Article
I, § 6 of the Utah
Constitution to enact
reasonable
regulations for the
control of
firearms.”).

Vermont

Vt. Const.
INTERCh. I,
MEDIATE
Art. 16
Ch. II, § 72,
but it must
receive 2/3
vote from
the senate in
the first
round

NO

YES
Ch. II,
§ 34

Virginia

Va. Const.
INTERArt. I, § 13. MEDIATE
Art. XII, § 1

NO

YES Unclear. Digiacinto
Art. VI, v. Rector & Visitors
§7
of George Mason
Univ., 704 S.E.2d
365, 368-70 (Va.
2011).

Implicit reasonable
regulation standard.
State v. Duranleau,
260 A.2d 383, 386
(Vt. 1969).

2016
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State

Right to
Amendment
Election
Bear
Initiative
Process (see
of
Arms
Power
Table IV)
Judges
Provision

Washington

Wash.
MOST
Const. Art. RIGOROUS
I, § 24.
Art. XXIII,
§1

YES
Art. II,
§1

West
Virginia

W. Va.
MOST
Const. Art. RIGOROUS
III, § 22.
Art. XIV,
§2

NO

Wisconsin Wis. Const. INTERArt. I, § 25. MEDIATE
Art. XII, § 1

NO

Wyoming Wyo. Const. MOST
YES
Art. I, § 24. RIGOROUS Art. III,
Art. XX
§ 52

Totals:

States with States with: States
Right to
Most
with
Bear Arms Rigorous Initiative
Provisions: Process: 28 Powers:
22 of 50
45 of 50
Intermediate
States with Process: 12
Individual
Least
Right to
Bear Arms: Rigorous
43 of 50 Process: 10
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Right to Bear
Arms Provision
Standard of
Review

YES
Reasonable
Art. IV, regulation standard.
§3
City of Seattle v.
Montana, 919 P.2d
1218 (Wash. 1996);
see also State v.
Gohl, 90 P. 259
(Wash. 1907).
YES
Reasonable
Art. VIII, regulation standard.
§2
Rohrbaugh v. State,
607 S.E.2d 404,
413-414 (W. Va.
2004); State ex rel.
City of Princeton v.
Buckner, 377 S.E.2d
139, 146
(W. Va. 1988).
YES
Reasonable
Art. VII, regulation standard.
§4
State v. Cole, 665
N.W.2d 328, 337
(Wis. 2003).
YES
Reasonable
Art. V, regulation standard.
§4
Carfield v. State,
649 P.2d 865, 87172 (Wyo. 1982).
States applying
States
Reasonable
with
Regulation
Judicial
Standard:
34
Elections:
42 of 50
Intermediate
Scrutiny: 1
Allowing Any
Regulation: 4
Unclear: 8
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TABLE IV: AMENDMENT PROCESSES
Process Type
LEAST RIGOROUS
STRUCTURE: Majority
Vote & Majority
Ratification

Description
(1) A majority of the legislature (both houses if there
are two) must approve the proposed amendment; and
(2) a majority of the voters must then ratify the
proposed amendment in the next election

INTERMEDIATE
(1) A majority of the legislature (both houses if there
STRUCTURE: 3 Majority are two) must approve the proposed amendment; (2)
Votes
the proposed amendment must then be re-approved by
the next-elected legislature; and (3) a majority of the
voters must then ratify it in the next election
MOST RIGOROUS
STRUCTURE:
Supermajority Vote &
Majority Ratification

(1) Either 2/3, 3/5, or 3/4 of the legislature (both
houses if there are two) must approve the proposed
amendment; and (2) a majority of the voters must then
ratify the proposed amendment in the next election

